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An Unlikely Populist: Donald Trump and the Rhetoric of Elite and Minority Resentment
Jared Quigley

Abstract:
Populist rhetoric is a political language employed by individual leaders which divides the
populace into two categories: a pure, moral people and a corrupt elite. In this paper, I examine
Donald Trump as a populist, focusing on Moffit’s political style approach (Moffit 2016) and
Mudde’s definition of populism as an ideology (Mudde 2004). Listening to speeches from the
campaign, I study how the components of these definitions of populism apply to Trump. I also
examine the groups that Trump defined as “the people,” “the elite,” and the “undeserving
minority groups.” I argue that while Trump does exhibit certain behaviors expected of populists,
he is far from a perfect fit into the existing definitions. Trump also attacks certain groups that
have been attacked by past right-wing populists in America, but also includes new groups,
namely donors, special interests, lobbyists, and “big business.” The mainly performative,
exclusionary populism that Trump demonstrated on the campaign trail is dangerous to the civic
health of a democracy as it attacks key institutions and norms and can be largely disconnected
from actual policy outcomes.
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Introduction
To win votes in elections, politicians invoke different rhetorical styles. Some employ
soaring, optimistic rhetoric, while others depend on jeremiads or base their appeal on fear. As
defined by political scientists, populists are those who divide the populace into two categories: a
pure, moral people and a corrupt elite. Right-wing populists in America and Europe win votes by
arguing that “the people” are being cheated by corrupt elites who favor undeserving minority
groups over the rest of the people. Throughout Donald Trump’s rise from a politically incorrect
real-estate developer to the White House, journalists, pundits, and other political actors tried to
explain how he could keep winning primaries and eventually the general election while enduring
controversies that would sink conventional politicians. A common refrain from those covering
Trump was that he was a different kind of candidate, a populist.
In this paper, I examine Trump as a populist by listening to 36 speeches during his
presidential campaign, documenting how he uses populist rhetoric and which groups he attacks. I
examine how political scientists have studied populism and how Trump fits into the existing
definitions that political scientists have offered. I examine the groups that Trump defined as “the
people,” “the elite,” and the “undeserving minority groups,” and document how and how often
he mentions these groups in campaign speeches. The rhetoric and style of populism are
important because they have been consistently present in American politics since the founding of
the country, and Trump’s use of populist rhetoric and style could be a blueprint for right-wing
populists in America for many years to come.
There has been much debate in the field of political science concerning the definition of
populism. The only constant in this debate is a dichotomy between “the elite” and “the people”
(Cramer 2016, Jansen 2011, Laclau 2005, Moffitt 2016, Mudde 2004, Roberts 2016, Roberts

Quigley 2
1995, Werner-Muller 2016, Weyland 2001). Outside of this basic dichotomy there is debate over
whether populism is an ideology (Mudde 2004, Roberts 2016), a rhetoric (Brubaker 2017, Jansen
2001), a political style (Brubaker 2017, Moffitt 2016), a political strategy (Weyland 2001), a
mobilization (Jansen 2011), or a part of the historical development of developing nations (Di
Tella 1965, Hennessy 1969, Spalding 1997). This debate has been raging since the emergence of
the idea of populism in the field of political science during the 1960s and 70s (Jansen 2011).
In this thesis, I begin by reviewing the scholarship on populism, from early works to the
more contemporary and conflicting perspectives on it. I then launch into a description of the two
most prominent competing perspectives, the ideological perspective and the performative
perspective. I write a brief history of right-wing populism in the United States after World War
Two, to identify the groups past right-wing populists in America have defined as “the elite,” “the
people,” and the “undeserving minority groups.” In my research design, I identify the
components of populism as seen in the definitions I apply to Trump, Mudde’s ideological
definition and Moffitt’s performative definition.
I next discuss my findings from the 36 campaign speeches that I listened to. I document
how and how often Trump invoked “the people,” attacked elites, invoked a crisis of
representation, targeted “others,” demonstrated bad manners, and bragged of a connection to the
elite. I document how and how often Trump mentioned common sense, political correctness,
support for or opposition to experts, an openness to negotiation and compromise, his opponents
being evil, and his intention to begin a new party. I found that while Trump used populist
rhetoric to an extent, he does not fit perfectly into existing definitions of populism, and this paper
demonstrates the benefits and pitfalls of describing Trump as a “populist.” Furthermore, the
mainly performative, exclusionary populism that Trump demonstrated on the campaign trail is
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dangerous as it attacks key institutions and norms as well as being largely separated from actual
policymaking.

Historical and Contemporary Competing Perspectives on Populism
The scholarly debate among political scientists on the topic of populism has evolved over
time and can be divided into three generations (Jansen 2011). Although the term was first used in
reference to the People’s Party of the 1890s, a left-leaning agrarian party in America, the first
generation of populism scholarship in the field of political science did not emerge until the 1960s
and 1970s (Jansen 2011). This generation of scholars focused on populism as a historical part of
either the modernization theory or structuralist Marxism (Di Tella 1965, Germani 1978,
Hennessy 1969, Klaren 1973, Skidmore 1979, Spalding 1977, Waisman 1987). Those scholars
“attempted to understand the social bases of support for classic populists...by focusing on the
economic determinants of populist coalitions” (Jansen 2011, 79). The second generation of
populism scholarship argued that populism was not a part of social structure but was rather a
discourse (Alexander 1973, Hawkins 2009, Laclau 2005, Wolfe 1994). This scholarship
“focused on the production and receptions- and most of all the content- of the personalities,
propaganda, and speeches of populist leaders” (Jansen 2011, 80). Other scholars of this
generation examined the reasons followers of populists supported the populist leaders (Auyero
1999, Spalding 1977). This scholarship “painted a picture of populist movements as empowered,
agentic, rational, and as a force for change- rather than as irrational and conservative” (Jansen
2011, 80).
The third and current generation of populist scholarship focuses on populism as a
political phenomenon and neopopulism, which is when populism is used to enact neoliberal
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policies (Huntington 1991, Jansen 2011, Moffitt 2016, Roberts 1996, Weyland 2001). Some
third-generation scholars argue that populism occurs when people are not firmly incorporated
into the political life of a nation (Jansen 2011, 81). The third generation has mainly focused on
populism as a political style or rhetoric and has tended to focus more on populist leaders than the
specific movements individual populists inspire as a whole.
There has been a negative perception of populism as a phenomenon through all three
generations of political science populism scholarship. Di Tella, an early populism scholar, noted
that “populism smacks of improvisation and irresponsibility, and by its nature is not regarded as
functional or efficient” (Di Tella 1965, 47). The main complaints scholars have had about
populism as a phenomenon is that it is demagogic and irresponsible. The term is often used to
describe opportunistic policies that are often short-term fixes rather than long-term solutions
(Mudde 2004, 542). This negativity extends outside academic circles to the mainstream media
and non-populist politicians as well. Roberts notes that the term “populism” is “typically hurled
as a catch-all epithet designed to demean or discredit political forces viewed as demagogic, antidemocratic, or politically irresponsible in their disruptive appeals to the basest instincts in a mass
body politics” (Roberts 2016, 69). It is impossible to discuss populism without noting the disdain
held towards it by political scientists, the mainstream media, and non-populist politicians.
It is also important to note the regionalism of populism scholarship. Latin America is a
more fertile ground for populism, as “European political systems are mostly parliamentary
regimes that center on more or less well-organized political parties, while Latin American
political systems are predominantly presidential, centered on strong individual leaders” (Mudde
2004, 156). Mudde divides populists into two categories, inclusionary populists and exclusionary
populists. Exclusionary populists exclude certain minority groups from their conceptions of “the
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people,” while inclusionary populists include these groups. Populism in Latin America tends to
be more inclusionary, while populism in Europe tends to be more exclusionary. As the United
States is more similar socially and economically to Europe, the populism that occurs in the
United States is more similar to the populism that occurs in the Europe, although the presidential
system provides a more fertile ground for populism in the United States than in Europe.
There are four main perspectives on populism among political scientists: the historical
perspective, economic perspective, ideological perspective, and political perspective. The
historical perspective contends that populism exists when certain sociopolitical conditions that
typically arise during the early stages of industrialization are present (Roberts 1995). The
economic perspective “reduces populism to fiscal indiscipline and a set of expansionist or
redistributive policies adopted in response to pressures of mass consumption” (Roberts 1995,
84). The economic and historical perspectives are similar because they contend that populism
arises under certain conditions. The ideological perspective contends that populism is a way of
seeing the world as one where “the people” and powerful elites are in constant conflict. The
political perspective “equates populism with a pattern of top-down mobilization by personalist
leaders that bypasses institutional forms of political mediation” (Roberts 1995, 85). These four
perspectives are the ways scholars discuss populism.
Contemporary political scientists have focused on the ideological and political
perspectives of populism. The scholars of the second and third generation have moved away
from the historical perspective. Roberts notes that recent works “have argued persuasively that
populism is a recurring phenomenon, rather than a period-specific historical anomaly” (Roberts
1995, 83). Similarly, political scientists have moved away from the economic perspective. As
noted by Weyland, “economic conceptualizations of populism are strikingly at odds with most
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contemporary theorizing on the subject by political scientists and sociologists” (Weyland 2001,
69).

The Ideological and Performative Perspectives of Populism
For the reasons described above, I focus on the ideological and political perspective of
populism. Roberts presents an ideological definition, contending that populism is “a way of
structuring the political field along an antagonistic divide between ‘the people’ however defined,
and some kind of elite or political establishment, also however defined” (Roberts 2016, 70). His
definition includes the basic starting point for all other definitions of populism: a dichotomy
between the “the people” and “the elite.” Mudde offers a similar definition, defining populism as
“an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’,” and which argues that “politics
should be an expression of the general will of the people” (Mudde 2004, 543). Mudde and
Roberts offer simple, ideological definitions of populism.
Who constitutes “the people” is extremely important to understanding populism. Mudde
notes that “the people in the populist propaganda are neither real nor all-inclusive but are in fact
a mythical and constructed subset of the whole population…. the people of the populists are an
imagined community” (Mudde 2004, 546). The populist dichotomy of “the people” opposing
“the elite” is a flexible framework, and populists choose how to define the two groups. Groups
that are commonly included in the “elite” or “undeserving minority groups” are “domestic class
or sectoral groups, political vested interests, the political establishment, intellectuals, foreign
powers, foreign representatives, or foreign groups residing within the borders of a country”
(Knight 1998, 230). Werner-Muller expands on this dichotomy, pointing out that more than
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being critical of the elite is needed to be a populist- otherwise any politician running against the
status quo could be considered a populist (Werner-Muller 2016, 61). She identifies the “tell-tale
sign of populism” as the populist leader claiming “that they, and only they, represent the people”
(Werner- Muller 2016, 62). These scholars emphasize the fact that the populist leader is able to
set the bounds of who constitutes “the people,” making the ideological and discursive
perspectives of populism flexible frameworks.
Recently, “a growing number of authors have shifted their focus towards how populism is
done- that is, how it is performed or enacted,” rather than seeing it as an ideology (Moffitt 2016,
52). Among these scholars are those who have viewed populism not as a worldview but as a
rhetoric, which can be used by those who have a populist worldview and those who do not
(Gidron and Bonikowski 2016, Hawkins 2009, Poblete 2015, Stavrakais and Katsambekis 2014).
The ideological definitions presented by Mudde and Roberts surface, but to these scholars
populism is not an ideology but a language, used by speakers who attempt to use it to mobilize a
group of people to act against ‘the elite,’ as defined by the individual speaker.
Hawkins describes populism as a rhetoric, one which “sees populism as a Manichaean
discourse that identifies Good with a unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite”
(Hawkins 2009, 1042). He argues that populist rhetoric is moral and dualistic, as it views the
world as a place where a battle between good and evil rages (Hawkins 2009). Similarly, “the
speech is heightened by ascribing cosmic proportions to them” (Hawkins 2009, 1063). The
discourse is democratic, romanticizing the common man, and articulates that the evil is in a
minority who was recently in charge and using the system to subvert the interests of the majority
(Hawkins 2009, 1064). Hawkins’ definition of populism as a rhetoric goes into more depth than
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Kazin’s more bare-boned definition and includes many of the common themes that continually
surface in the works of “performative turn” scholars of populism.
Other scholars define populism as a political style (de la Torre 2010, Knight 2013,
Mondon 2013, Moffitt 2016). Moffitt defines populism as “a political style that features an
appeal to ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite,’ bad manners, and the performance of crisis, breakdown,
or threat” (Moffitt 2016, 56). While the appeal to the “the people” versus “the elite” is the
cornerstone of very definition of populism, Moffitt's inclusion of bad manners and the
performance of crisis is unique to his definition. Knight also describes populism as a political
style, which includes “a proclaimed rapport with ‘the people,’ a ‘them-and-us’ mentality, and a
period of crisis and mobilization” (Knight 1998). Weyland defines populism as “a political
strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on
direct, unmediated, institutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized
followers” (Weyland 2001, 14). This definition implies that populism is more than just a rhetoric
or a style; it is the basis on which populist leaders claim legitimacy.
Brubaker focuses on populism as both a rhetoric and style. After recognizing the
people/elite dichotomy, he asserts that there are five core elements of populism. One of these
elements is “antagonistic depoliticization,” which is “the claim to reassert democratic political
control over domains of life that are seen as having been removed from the realm of democratic
decision making” (Brubaker 2017, 364). The other elements are “majoritarianism,” “antiinstitutionalism,” “protectionism” as well as the style of populism, which Brubaker describes as
including rhetorical “simplicity, directness, and seeming self-evidence, often accompanied by an
explicitly anti-intellectualism” as well as a “willingness to break taboos and disrupt the
conventions of polite speech and normal body language” (Brubaker 2017, 367). In creating his
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definition, Brubaker focuses on both the rhetorical performance of a populist as well as their
style more generally.
Jansen also views populism as a performance, offering a definition of populism that
refers to it both as a discourse and as a mobilization. He advocates for viewing populism as “a
mode of political practice- as a specific set of actions that politicians and their supporters dorather than a type of movement party, regime, or ideology” (Jansen 2011, 82). He defines
populism as a “sustained, large-scale political project that mobilizes ordinarily marginalized
social sectors into publicly visible and contentious political action, while articulating an antielite, nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people” (Jansen 2011, 82). Jansen’s mobilization
definition goes beyond the other political definitions to include the followers of a populist leader.
While the scholars in this section differ in their views of exactly what populism is, they all view
it as a political action rather than an ideology or part of history.

Components of Populism
In the previous section, I outlined the main perspectives through which political scientists
have viewed populism. Just as important to understanding the phenomenon is identifying the
components of populism that political scientists have identified as being key to identifying
political actors as populists. Some political scientists focus on populism as emanating from
individual leaders (Mudde 2004, Weyland 2001), while others note that it can also be a
grassroots movement (Rasmussen and Schoen 2010). Using the definitions presented in the
previous section, I next identify components that political scientists have identified as being
important to populism.
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The dichotomy of “the people” and “the elite” is the core of all definitions of populism
(Jansen 2011, Laclau 2005, Moffitt 2016, Mudde 2004, Roberts 2016, Roberts 1995, WernerMuller 2016, Weyland 2001). Roberts further notes that “the people” will always be moral, and
“the elite” will always be corrupt (Roberts 2016, 70). Mudde also refers to “the people” as pure.
(Mudde 2004, 543). Thus, to put it simply, populist rhetoric divides the populace into two
categories: a pure, moral people and a corrupt elite.
Beyond this cornerstone, populist leaders engage in several other rhetorical invocations.
They often invoke the presence of a real or imagined conflict, as populism “gets its impetus from
the perception of crisis, breakdown, or threat and at the same time aims to induce crisis through
dramatization and performance” (Moffitt 2016, 55). Populists promise to rescue “the people”
from threats and enemies (Weyland 2001, 14). They “claim to protect ‘the people’ from above,
from below, and, today especially, from the outside” (Brubaker 2017, 366). This perception of a
conflict is a predictor of support for populism among members of a population, as “surveys have
shown that one’s personal socio-economic situation and support for right-wing populist parties
often does not correlate at all, because the latter is based on a much more general assessment of
the situation of one’s country” (Mudde 2004, 59).
The crisis invoked is often a crisis of representation, related to the disconnect between
citizens and their representatives (Moffitt 2013, 56). Laclau identified a crisis of representation
in the political institutional domain as an essential precondition to populism (Laclau 2005).
Populism “distrusts the mediating functions of institutions, especially political parties, media,
and courts” (Brubaker 2017, 365). For this reason, populists often claim that “they, and only
they, represent the people” (Werner-Muller 2016, 61). Thus, populist rhetoric invokes the
presence of a real or imagined crisis, which is often a crisis of representation.
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As defined by political scientists, populists base their legitimacy on representing the will
of the people which causes them to feel pressure to demonstrate this widespread popular support.
He notes that “elections, plebiscites, mass demonstrations, and most recently opinion polls are
the crucial instruments with which populist leaders mobilize and demonstrate their distinctive
power capability” in order to “overpower their opponent’s institutional bastions” (Weyland 2001,
12). Populists argue that “common sense” supports their positions when facts and figures do not.
This appeal to common sense “often takes the form of the denial of expert knowledge” and is
used as a weapon against “bureaucrats, technocrats, and representatives” (Moffitt 2016, 55). This
appeal to the “common sense” of “the people” can also take the form of an attack on the
“political correctness” of the elite (Moffitt 2016, 55). Mudde also notes that the “politically
correct” are a group populists target (Mudde 2004, 561). Finally, right-wing populists in Europe
and the United States often claim to be the voice of a ‘silent majority’” (Mudde 2004, 165).
Thus, populist rhetoric invokes popularity as legitimacy, appeals to common sense, rails against
political correctness and claims to represent a silent majority.
Right-wing populists in Europe and the United States “focus on protecting the conditions
for a good life for ‘the people,’ which they consider increasingly threatened by outside forces
(notably immigrants)” (Mudde 2004, 160). These foreigners can include groups “such as asylum
seekers, migrant workers, or particular minority groups” and they are portrayed by populists as
“as enemies of ‘the people’” (Moffitt 2016, 55). However, since immigrants are not part of the
ruling elite, populists must find other ways to link foreigners to the elite (Moffitt 2016, 55).
Populists often define “the people” in terms of race or immigration status, making populist
rhetoric often racist or xenophobic.
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Performative turn scholars of populism point to stylistic components as being important
to the study of populism. Populists also set themselves apart from the established elite by having
“bad manners.” By bad manners, Moffitt refers to “a coarsening of political rhetoric and a
disregard for appropriate modes of acting in the political realm” (Moffitt 2016, 55). Moffitt gives
examples of these bad manners, including “directness, playfulness, bullying, coarse language, a
disregard for hierarchy and tradition, ready resort to anecdotes as evidence, and a studied
ignorance of that which does not interest” the populist (Moffitt 2016, 55). Hawkins concurs,
writing that populist speech “shows a bellicosity toward the opposition that is incendiary and
condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent” (Hawkins 2009, 1064).
Brubaker notes further that populists “break taboos, refuse euphemisms, and disrupt the
conventions of polite speech and normal demeanor” (Brubaker 2017, 367). Bad manners are the
core of the populist style.
Coupled with these bad manners is an affinity for conspiracy theories. Right wing
populists contend that the common people are disenfranchised because of an elite conspiracy
(Mudde 2004, 166). When populists lose elections, they are more likely to question the election
results, as they feel they “only lose if ‘the silent majority’ has not had a chance to speak, or, even
worse, has been prevented from expressing itself” (Werner-Muller 2016, 61). Conspiracy
theories assist populists in forming their “elite”/ “the people” worldview and their subsequent
vilifying of “the elite.” This “frequent invocation of conspiracy theories by populists” is often
articulated as “something going on behind the scenes has to account for the fact that corrupt
elites are still keeping the people down” (Werner-Muller 2016, 61).
There is a persistent anti-intellectualism that surfaces among populists. Populists display
this anti-intellectualism when they “valorize common sense and first-hand experience over
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abstract and experience-distant forms of knowledge” (Brubaker 2017, 367). Populist movements
often “spurn intellectuals” (Knight 1998, 230). This anti-intellectualism surfaces in the rhetoric
of populism through invocations of “common sense.” This appeal to common sense “often takes
the form of the denial of expert knowledge” and is used as a weapon against “bureaucrats,
technocrats, and representatives” (Moffitt 2016, 55). Populists also offer simple solutions to
complex problems, which is part of their appeal (Mudde 2004, 542).
Charismatic leadership and direct contact between the populist leader and their followers
is another part of the populist style as identified by performative turn scholars. The populist style
“implies a close bond between political leaders and the led” (Knight 1998, 226). Charismatic
leadership is “common among populists” and is one of the “features (which) facilitates rather
than defines populism” (Mudde 2004, 545). Weyland writes that populism occurs when “a
charismatic leader wins broad, diffuse, yet intense support from a largely unorganized mass
(Weyland 2001, 14). Mudde views direct communication, as another trait that is “common
among populists” (Mudde 2004, 545). Populists “seek frequent face-to-face contacts with the
masses, now often through television” (Weyland 2001, 14). This direct communication is
specific to populism because “under populism the ruler is an individual, the connection between
leaders and followers is based mostly on direct, quasi-personal communication, not an organized
intermediation” (Weyland 2001, 13). Weyland argues that “to compensate for the fragility of
their mass support, populist leaders seek to create a particularly intense connection to their
followers” and that this connection is best created through direct contact (Weyland 2001, 13).
To understand populism, it is important to understand the definitions and components of
populism as described above. While there is great debate among political scientists about what
populism is, the two main schools of thought are those who view populism as an ideology and
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those who view it as a performance. I use one of the political scientists in the first camp (Mudde)
and one in the second camp (Moffitt) to examine Trump as a populist. In the next section, I write
about the recent history of right-wing populism in America, which began with George Wallace
and surfaced again with Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and the Tea Party. While America has
also has a history of left-wing populism, stretching from the original Populists to the labor
movement of the Gilded Age to the New Left of the 1960s (Kazin 1995), I am only concerned
with right-wing populism in this paper. This examination of the history of right-wing populism
in America will provide an idea of which groups Trump would be expected to include in his
categorizations of “the people,” “the elite,” and the “undeserving minority groups.”

A Brief History of Right-wing Populism in America
Populism has a long history in America, with the term first surfacing in regards to the
People’s Party of the 1890s, a left-wing party comprised of farmers in the American West and
South (Kazin 1995). Populism can refer to both liberals and conservatives, but this paper focuses
on right-wing populism. Right-wing populism in contemporary America follows a framework
first articulated by George Wallace during the 1960s (Kazin 1995, Lesher 1995). Wallace, the
Governor of Alabama, is largely remembered for standing in the schoolhouse door at the
University of Alabama in an attempt to block its integration. He ran three campaigns for
President that were largely based around maintaining segregation, but which also relied on
populist rhetoric and style in an attempt to win votes. Although Wallace was a conservative
Democrat, it was the Republicans, beginning with Nixon and continuing until the present day,
who have used “the rhetorical defense of hard working Americans against the liberal elite”
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increasingly since 1968 (Kazin 1995, 247). Thus, George Wallace is the starting point for
examining right-wing populism in America.
Wallace’s definition of the people was distinctly white and blue collar. He once named
“his kind of people” as “the man in street- your steelworkers, your oil workers, building trades
workers, beauticians, little businessmen, and farmers, and your policemen and firemen” (Kazin
1995, 395). Wallace aimed to give voice to any citizen who was “harassed by arrogant but inept
bureaucrats, slovenly and unpatriotic protesters, and criminal minorities- none of whom did
anything useful for society” (Kazin 1995, 224). Wallace’s campaign was “driven by pure
resentment, an ability to whip up the hostilities of certain average whites and channel them in his
direction” (Kazin 1995, 239). To Wallace, the common white American was losing out in a
system run by corrupt, liberal politicians who were favoring minorities and hippies over the
common man.
Wallace specifically attacked “elite” mainstream politicians and bureaucrats by
emphasizing states’ rights. His main targets on the national stage were “powerful judges,
bureaucrats, and theoreticians” who wanted to impose “‘absurd’ blueprints for change on
average men and women” (Kazin 1995, 234). The states’ rights Wallace was focused on was a
state’s right to remain segregated, and the “absurd blueprints” he railed against were civil rights
bills. One way Wallace opposed civil rights bills, specifically the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was
by invoking property rights. Opponents of the Civil Rights Act, including Wallace, argued that it
“would dramatically restrict the right to exclude from private property” (Brophy 2016, Leshner
1995). While subtler, this invocation of property rights was an important way Wallace opposed
the politicians who were pushing for civil rights bills.
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Wallace argued for segregation and against civil rights bills mainly by attacking federal
encroachment. He had “no tolerance for ‘the crowd above the Potomac River’ who try ‘to tell us
how to go about it’” (Kazin 1995, 230). “A vote for this little governor,” he once remarked, “will
let people in Washington know that we want them to leave our house, schools, jobs, businesses,
and farms alone” (Leshner 1995, 284). He attacked the both parties, arguing that “there isn’t a
dime’s worth of difference” between them, and that both were failing to represent the interests of
white Americans (Kazin 1995, 240). The politicians, bureaucrats and judges of the federal
government were “the elite” of Wallace’s populism.
The Wallace campaigns during the 1960s were built on the foundation of racial
resentment and the contention that the politicians pushing civil rights were favoring -Americans
over white Americans. During his earlier campaigns for Governor and his run for President in
1964, he used overtly racist justifications for segregation. While travelling the country before his
campaign in 1964, he described African-Americans as “easy going, basically happy,
unambitious, and incapable of much learning” (Leshner 1995, 263). He praised “mulattos” for
“inheriting the mentality and personality of their white ancestor” before saying that the same was
not the case for their “less capable African half-brother” (Leshner 1995, 263).
In 1968, however, Wallace largely shifted away from overt racism and spoke more in
coded language. Avoiding overtly racist statements in public, Wallace instead argued that
“segregation serves the best interest of all of our people” (Kazin 1995, 231). Wallace’s political
strength resulted from the “anti-black feelings that he skillfully whipped up with the use of code
phrases like ‘law and order’ and ‘neighborhood schools’” (Kazin 1995, 233). This use of coded
language was noticed by observers of the 1968 campaign, one of whom wrote that Wallace
“never mentions racism and, increasingly, has put his candidly segregationist views on the back
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burner. Defending ‘property rights’ is just as effective and the message is just as clear” (Leshner
1995, 413). Categorizing African-Americans as an undeserving minority group in a subtle way
was crucially important in Wallace’s popularity among those uncomfortable with Wallace’s
more blatantly racist past.
Wallace attacked those protesting the Vietnam war on college campuses and throughout
the country in direct and indirect ways. He frequently verbally attacked hecklers at his rallies,
and once warned “that protestors or hippies who dared lie down to block his car would learn it
would be the last car they ever blocked” (Kazin 1995, 399). His attacks on anti-war protestors
included often attacking those “guilty of treason” for “raising money and donating blood for the
VietCong” (Leshner 1995, 392). Pro-police tough talk was common in Wallace’s rhetoric,
including statements such as “Let the police run this country for a year or two and three and
wouldn’t be any riots” (Kazin 1995, 236). During a time of unrest in the United States about the
Vietnam War, Wallace tried to win votes by placing the “hippies” who were culturally different
from the voters he sought into his categorization of “the elite.”
Wallace attacked the media as part of “the elite.” The media’s supposed communism was
one of the lines of attack; Wallace reminded crowds at rallies that the New York Times had called
Fidel Castro “the Robin Hood of the Caribbean”, when “every taxi driver in Montgomery knew
he was a communist” (Kazin 1995, 236). He once said “the American people are sick and tired
of columnists and TV dudes” who “try to slant and destroy and malign and brainwash the
country” (Leshner 1995, 309). During his speeches Wallace did not attack the individual
reporters who were attending his rallies, who he described as “hardworking reporters,” and
instead focused his anger on “the editors, back in offices, that write all that stuff” (Kazin 1995,
240). Finally, Wallace and his close associates would pack rooms used for press conferences “in
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advance with supporters who disrupted the conferences by booing reporters’ questions and
cheering Wallace’s answers” (Carlson 1981, 35).
Wallace also argued that intellectuals were a part of the “elite”. One of Wallace’s go-to
applause lines at his rallies was about a professor who “knows how to run the Vietnam War but
can’t park his bicycle straight” (Kazin 1995, 236). He often “urged his audience to laugh at the
ineptness and impracticality of liberal intellectuals” (Kazin 1995, 236). He also threatened to
“seek an indictment against any college professor who calls for a communist victory in
Vietnam...that’s not free speech, that’s treason” (Leshner 1995, 421). Wallace used clueless
professors to draw a contrast with his followers, whom he portrayed as having the wisdom of
common sense.
The strand of right-wing populism that Wallace created began being echoed by
Republicans during the very election that Wallace was running in. During the 1968 campaign,
Richard Nixon “espoused more and more of Wallace’s core campaign,” speaking out on the
issues of “crime, school busing, federal enforcement of school desegregation, antiwar activists
and the federal judiciary (Leshner 1995, 403). Further, Nixon hoped “to co-opt” Wallace’s effort
by “portraying himself in the South as a more electable version of Wallace” (Kalk 1994, 87).
“The people” in Nixon’s imagination consisted of “labor leaders and people from middle
America who still have character and guts and a bit of patriotism” (Kazin 1995, 249). This
concept of “Middle America” invoked “a feeling of being squeezed between penthouse and
ghetto- between a condescending elite above and scruffy demonstrators and welfare recipients
below” (Kazin 1995, 153). Along with the phrase “Middle America,” Nixon also popularized the
term “silent majority,” which implied that Nixon had the support of “the people.”
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Nixon also spoke out against protesters, once saying the government should meet “force
with force” when it came to protestors and provide “retaliation against the perpetrators and
planners of violence” (Leshner 403). Nixon also catered to White America through his Southern
Strategy. Nixon’s Southern strategy consisted of promising segregationist leaders he would “stop
accelerating federal commitment to racial integration” as well as using coded language such as
“law and order,” just as Wallace had (Kalk 1994, 88). During the 1968 campaign, Nixon argued
that the federal government was “going too far” in the pursuit of school integration in the South
(Leshner 403). This catering to White America at the expense of African-Americans, while much
less blatant that Wallace’s racism, was a way to categorize African-Americans as part of an
undeserving minority group.
The largest development to right-wing populism during the Nixon years was the ferocity
with which Nixon and his administration attacked the media. While Presidents have always
criticized the press for treating them unfairly, Nixon’s administration popularized the term
“media,” “believing it had a colder, more sinister sound than the traditional ‘press’” and offered
“the media” as a “new type of elite” (Kazin 1995, 252). Pat Buchanan, then a speechwriter for
the Nixon administration, stated that “there is no element in American life more out of touch
with the concerns and beliefs of the common man than the liberal press” (Kazin 1995, 252).
Members of Nixon’s administration were the first to attack the “liberal media” in a serious way.
Ronald Reagan also relied on the rhetoric of populism to a great degree (Kazin 1995). He
claimed to represent “the people” as opposed to the Democrats, who “used to fight for the
working families of America, but now only seem to fight for the special interests” (Kazin 1995,
262). Statements like this made it seem like “a bundle of privileged minorities were the problemorganized feminists, homosexuals, advocates of affirmative action, public schools, and
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government unions,” though Reagan rarely attacked these groups by name (Kazin 1995, 262).
Reagan’s rhetoric separating “the people” from “the special interests” is inherently populist.
Reagan’s populism also included the Wallace groups. His argument about cutting back
the welfare state rested on the assumption that “elite interests and the black poor were colluding
in parasitic embrace” (Kazin 1995, 263). Also included in the Reaganite script of populist
rhetoric were “federal bureaucrats, the mass media, and arrogant academics” (Kazin 1995, 266).
He attacked protesters as well, saying in his 1968 campaign that they were “rabble rousers and
hate-mongers, members of the New Left who are really unwashed members of the old right
practicing storm trooper tactics” (Leshner 1995, 407).
However, the comparisons among Wallace and Nixon and Reagan are not perfect and
classifying Nixon and Reagan as populists is problematic. Nixon, a Republican politician who
had served in Congress and as Vice President, did not attack “politicians” and the political
parties in the same way that Wallace did. Nixon and Reagan’s comments on race were nowhere
near as inflammatory as Wallace’s. The largest difference between these politicians was their
political style. Wallace was a charismatic speaker, who endeared himself to “the people” through
his bad manners, while Nixon was much more reserved man who, for the most part, followed the
mainstream rules that governed the behaviors of politicians during the time. Reagan also did not
display the bad manners that are an important part of the populist style. While most scholars of
right-wing populism would apply the title of “populist” to Wallace, fewer would be inclined to
apply it to Reagan and Nixon because of these stylistic differences.
Conservatives following the “Reagan Revolution” continued to mimic his populist
rhetoric. While George H.W Bush was often criticized for his “inability to speak the language of
populism,” other conservatives at the time used populist rhetoric, such as Pat Buchanan, who
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“ran a campaign ‘aimed at Main Street as opposed to Wall Street’” (Brewer 2016, 250, Kazin
1995, 270). Newt Gingrich and the “Contract with America” Republicans “knew how vital
(populist anger) was to infusing their antigovernment cause with moral legitimacy (Kazin 1995,
275). George W. Bush portrayed himself as “a simple man who shared the values and
perspectives of the common people rather than those of Washington,” and “was often described
as adopting a somewhat populist persona” (Brewer 2016, 250, Perry 2014, 101). Finally, Sarah
Palin used populist rhetoric, complaining about “so-called academic and cultural elite” as well as
“the Left, who is ashamed of saying that America is good” (Larson and Porpora 2011, 769).
Stretching from Reagan to the Tea Party was a line of conservatives who knew how to
successfully craft arguments that were populist in nature.
Rasmussen and Schoen argue that the Tea Party was populist, attributing its rise to “an
unprecedented crisis of confidence” in American “economic, political and social systems,”
because of income inequality, economic dislocation and globalization (Rasmussen and Schoen
2010, 53). Tea Party supporters believed that “the economic system works only for the elite” and
that “the political elite are becoming detached from the nation at large” (Rasmussen and Schoen
2010, 55). In the Tea Party’s imagination, “the people” who are being hurt by the elites and the
undeserving minority groups that the elites favor are “ordinary people,” who “have always
believed that if they worked hard and paid their taxes things would work out in the end and they
would get ahead” (Rasmussen and Schoen 2010, 95). This is not a reality for these “ordinary
people” anymore, and they respond by blaming political, economic and cultural elites
(Rasmussen and Schoen 2010).
The “undeserving minority groups” in Tea Party populism were similar to the groups
Wallace first attacked. Tea Party supporters wanted to get rid of entitlements they believe go to
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undeserving African-Americans and immigrants (Edsall 2012, 58). Another major issue to
members of the Tea Party was immigration: 83 percent of Tea Party supporters saw immigration
as a serious problem, significantly more than any other group (Sustar 2013, 60). Tea Party
supporters were also anti-government, and many “Tea Party candidates,” conservative
Republicans who vowed to “shake things up” in Washington were elected to the House of
Representatives in 2010 (Rasmussen and Schoen 2010). The Tea Party showed the appeal of
right-wing populism in the years preceding the 2016 campaign.
Since populists tell voters that the “elites are out of touch with ordinary people, trampling
on their interests and usurping resources for themselves and undeserving minorities groups,”
understanding who is included in each of a populist’s categorizations is key to understanding the
populist’s greater electoral strategy (Cramer 201, 86). The categorization in Table 1.1 below
shows the groups that have been a part of the conceptualizations of right-wing populists in
America.
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Table 1.1: Elites and Undeserving Minority Groups in Right-Wing Populism
Elite and Undeserving Minority Group As Categorized By These Presidents/ Groups
Politicians/ bureaucrats

Wallace, Reagan, Tea Party

Both Political Parties

Wallace, Tea Party

Media

Wallace, Nixon, Reagan, Tea Party

African-Americans

Wallace, Nixon, Reagan, Tea Party

Protestors

Wallace, Nixon, Reagan

Intellectuals

Wallace

Immigrants

Tea Party

Politicians and political parties in our democracy win elections by building coalitions
through courting active groups (Dahl 1956, Bishin 2000). Understanding which groups Donald
Trump defined as “the people,” “the elites,” and the “undeserving minority groups” is vitally
important to how he used the language of populism, and to understanding which groups may be
included in the rhetoric of conservative populism in America in the coming years. Right-wing
populists in America have traditionally been exclusionary, attacking minority groups as “other,”
which is problematic, as minority rights is a cornerstone of our constitutional system.
Furthermore, the groups traditionally targeted by right-wing populists are groups that are already
vulnerable and become further maligned as the result of being the target of right-wing populists.
These attacks on weaker groups in society go against the Western values of openness, tolerance,
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and diversity. In the next section, I present how I will structure my inquiry of the populism of
Donald Trump, focused on two competing definitions of populism.

What Moffit and Mudde Have in Common
In my inquiry of Trump as populist, I will be focusing on two theories: Moffitt’s political
style approach and Mudde’s theory of populism as outlined in his work, “The Populist Zeitgeist.”
Both political scientists suggest a transnational phenomenon while noting that populism can and
does occur in North America. I chose these specific definitions because the ideological and
performative perspectives of populism are the two major contemporary competing perspectives
on populism. Moffitt’s political style approach will allow me to examine how Trump fits in
which the scholarship of those who view populism as a performance. Mudde’s ideological
approach allows me to examine how Trump fits into the scholarship of political scientists who
view populism as an ideology.
First, there are some components of Moffitt and Mudde’s definitions that overlap. The
dichotomy of “the people” and “the elite” is the core of all definitions of populism, including
Moffitt and Mudde’s (Moffitt 2016, Mudde 2004). Moffitt and Mudde also both note that “the
people” in the populist imagination are wise, and that populist leaders appeal to “common sense”
as the basis of good policy making. Moffitt writes that “the people” are “presented as the true
holders of sovereignty” by the populist, who often champion “common sense” (Moffitt 2016,
55). Mudde writes that for populists “the consciousness of the people, referred to as common
sense, is the basis of all good politics (Mudde 20014, 547).
Moffitt and Mudde both argue that populists point to a crisis of representation, as the
impetus of their arrival on the political scene. Populism “gets its impetus from the perception of
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crisis, breakdown, or threat and at the same time aims to induce crisis through dramatization and
performance” (Moffitt 2016, 55). This perception of a conflict is a predictor of support for
populism among members of a population, as support for right-wing populist parties is correlated
with a negative assessment of the situation of one’s country (Mudde 2004, 59). The crisis
invoked is often a crisis of representation, related to the disconnect between citizens and their
representatives (Moffitt 2013, 56). Mudde writes that populists argue that political parties
“corrupt the link between leaders and supporters, create artificial divisions within the
homogeneous people, and put their own interests above those of the people” (Mudde 2004, 546).
Finally, both Moffitt and Mudde agree that populists allow no room for negotiation,
deliberation, and compromise. Mudde writes that because populists view “the elite” as evil,
“compromise is impossible, as it ‘corrupts’ the purity” of the populist leader and “the people”
(Mudde 2004, 544). Moffitt contends that populists favor “short-term and swift action rather than
the ‘slow politics of negotiation and deliberation” (Moffitt 2016, 56). Furthermore, “that which
gets in the way of addressing the issue or the crisis has to be ignored, supplanted or removed”
(Moffitt 2016, 56). In conclusion, both political scientists argue that the “the people” vs. “the
elite” dichotomy, the belief that the consciousness of the people is the basis of good governance,
an appeal to “common sense,” the presence of a crisis and anti-party sentiment, and that
populists do not believe in negotiation, deliberation and compromise are components of
populism.

Components Specific to Moffit
Despite having some components in common, Moffitt's political style approach differs
from Mudde’s ideological approach in several ways. Moffitt notes that populists “may also target
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others- such as asylum seekers, immigrant workers, or particular minority groups” as “enemies
of the people” and that these “others” will be linked to “the elite” (Moffitt 2016, 55). Populists
often accuse “the elite” as unfairly favoring these undeserving minority groups at the expense of
“the people.” These others are often “asylum seekers, immigrant workers, or particular minority
groups” (Moffitt 2016, 55). This inclusion of “others” being tied to “the elite” is unique to
Moffitt’s definition.
In Moffitt’s definition, populists are opposed to political correctness, bureaucrats and
technocrats, and must prove their outsider status. Moffitt writes that populists “include claims
against the ‘political correctness’ of ‘the elite,’” which they invoke to “prove their outsider
status” (Moffitt 2016, 55). Populists deny “expert knowledge” and promote the use of “common
sense” at the expense of “bureaucrats, technocrats, representatives, or ‘guardians of our interests”
(Moffitt 2016, 55). This distrust of experts and opposition to political correctness are
demonstrated by populists in order to prove their outsider status in Moffitt’s definition.
The most significant part of Moffitt’s definition is the inclusion of bad manners as being
critical identifying populists. These bad manners include “a coarsening of political rhetoric and a
disregard for ‘appropriate’ modes of acting in the political realm” (Moffitt 2016, 55). Elements
of this “low” style of political actions include “the use of slang, swearing, political incorrectness,
and being overly demonstrative and ‘colorful’” as well as bullying, bad language and a disregard
for institutions and norms (Moffitt 2016, 55). These bad manners are at the center of Moffitt’s
political style definition of populism.
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Components Specific to Mudde
Mudde’s definition of populism as an ideology includes several components that are not
in Moffitt’s political style definition. Mudde writes that to populists, “there are only friends and
foes,” leading them to believe that “opponents are not just people with different priorities and
values, they are evil!” (Mudde 2004, 544). Moffitt touches on the enemies populists make, but
does not contend that populists believe that their enemies are evil. Mudde also goes further than
Moffitt on the topic of anti-party sentiment, writing that populists “oppose the established
parties” and “call for, or claim to be, a new kind of party” (Mudde 2004, 546). While Moffitt
contends that populists argued that the current “establishment politicians” are hurting “the
people,” Mudde argues that populists create new political parties.
Finally, Mudde differs from Moffitt in contending that populists are not necessarily
against expert opinions and are not necessarily outsiders. He writes that “populism is not
necessarily opposed to technocratic measures,” and that “this trust in ‘experts’ and the
simultaneous distrust of politicians, can be found in the ideas of contemporary populists”
(Mudde 2004, 547). Mudde also contends that “the populist leader is not necessarily a true
outsider,” and that some populists can be described as “outsider-elites: connected to the elites,
but not a part of them” (Mudde 2004, 560). These two claims, that populists are not necessarily
opposed to expert opinions and are not necessarily outsiders, differentiate Mudde’s populism as
an ideology theory and Moffitt’s political style theory.
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Table 1.2: Moffitt and Mudde Components of Populism
Component of Populism

Scholar

Specific Example

“The People” vs “The Elite”

Both Moffitt and Mudde

“The people” “the elite”

Common Sense

Both Moffitt and Mudde

“Common sense,” “the people
know better”

Crisis of Representation

Both Moffitt and Mudde

“Politicians have failed you”

No negotiation, deliberation,
compromise

Both Moffitt and Mudde

“Enough talk, we need
action”

Populists target “Others”

Moffitt

“(Minority group) are
criminals”

Anti- “Political Correctness”

Moffitt

“Political correctness is bad”

Opposed to Bureaucrats,
Technocrats and Experts

Moffitt

“We have the worst people
telling our leaders what to do”

Bad Manners

Moffitt

Slang, swearing, anecdotes as
evidence

Opponents are evil

Mudde

“Morally corrupt” “Evil”

Call for new party

Mudde

“Run as independent” “Both
parties are bad”

Can Support Experts

Mudde

“Scientists say” “Economists
say”

Connected to Elites

Mudde

“I am wealthy and know all
the politicians”

I use the above components of populism in order to examine whether Trump acts in the
way a populist is expected to and to see whether he fits into either Moffitt or Mudde’s definition
better than the other. Outlining the components of populism and clarifying the differences
between Moffitt and Mudde, as I did in the above section, makes this an either task. In the next
section, I outline the methodology of how I examined Trump as a populist. I outline what
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specific language I was listening for in the campaign speeches I listened to and how this
language fulfills each of the above components.

Methodology
I listened to thirty-six Trump campaign speeches, two speeches per month from every
month of the Trump campaign, from June 2015 to November 2016. The first speech I listened to
was his campaign announcement speech on June 16, 2015 and the last speech was his victory
speech, given in the early hours of November 9, 2016. Listening to thirty-six speeches allowed
me to examine a breadth of content from throughout the time Trump was a candidate. I found
these speeches on YouTube (see Appendix for a list of links to these speeches). I recorded how
Trump invokes the components of populism as identified by Mudde in Moffitt and outlined in
Table 1.2 and noted the times he acted in differently than what would be expected of a populist.
I also examined which groups Donald Trump includes in his categorization of “the elite” and
“undeserving minority groups” (Table 1.1). I created a spreadsheet to collect this data. This
research design allows me to examine if and how Trump fits into both Moffitt and Mudde’s
definitions of populism, as well as taking a look at the groups that comprise “the elite” and
“others” in Trump’s populist imagination.
In a content analysis, it is important to be clear about what keywords were listened for
and how the content was coded. A more through explanation of my content analysis is in order.
Specifically, I counted any direct mention of the term “the people” or “people” in the category
“The People.” An example of when Trump would say “people” instead of “the people” (without
the meaning changing) comes from his campaign announcement speech, when he told a crowd
that “people are saying ‘what’s going on? I just want a job” (6/16/15). Both Mudde and Werner-
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Muller note that populists can use the term “silent majority” to refer to “the people,” so I coded
mentions of the “silent majority” under the “The People” category (Mudde 2004, Werner-Muller
2016). Finally, I also coded anytime Trump contrasted his crowd with “the elite” as an
invocation of “the people,” such as when he told a crowd “you are my bosses, not the lobbyists,
not the special interests, and not the donors” (12/5/15).
Along with coding direct mentions of “the elite” in the “The Elite” category, I also coded
the times Trump attacked the groups that made up his elite, namely politicians, the media, special
interests, donors, lobbyists, PACs, hedge funds, big business, and Wall Street. Similarly,
included in the “Other” category the times Trump attacked the groups that made up the
“undeserving minority groups” in Trumpian populism, namely Muslims, immigrants, refugees,
Black Lives Matter, and protestors. The coding for the “Common Sense” and “Anti-Political
Correctness” categories was also straightforward, as I only coded times Trump directly used
those phrases under those categories.
Under the “Crisis of Representation” category, I coded the times that Trump attacked
politicians and America’s leaders more generally, as well as the times he mentioned that
America was an international laughingstock. I also included times that Trump accused donors,
special interests, and lobbyists of controlling America’s political system, as well as complaints
about “the system” generally. Under the “No negotiation, deliberation, compromise” category, I
included the times Trump complained of “all talk, no action politicians” and when he
complained about how all politicians do is talk without using that phrase directly. Interestingly,
Trump made many statements that demonstrated an openness to negotiation and compromise,
which is exactly the opposite of what both Moffitt and Mudde would expect of a populist. Under
the “Open to negotiation, deliberation, compromise” section, I listened for and coded the times
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that Trump mentioned his skill in negotiation (usually through bragging about The Art of the
Deal), complained about the inability of America’s leaders to negotiate good deals, and
mentioned the fact that he knew people who were good negotiators.
A difficult category to code was the “Bad Manners” category. According to Moffitt, the
bad manners that a populist exhibits include “directness, playfulness, bullying, coarse language,
a disregard for hierarchy and tradition, ready resort to anecdotes as evidence, and a studied
ignorance of that which does not interest” (Moffitt 2016, 55). However, it is very difficult to
measure directness, playfulness, and a disregard for hierarchy and tradition. For the category of
bad manners, I counted the Trump statements that include swearing, using anecdotes as
evidence, making fun of the injured, spreading conspiracy theories, giving out the personal
phone number of an opponent, doing impressions of foreigners, advocating violence, namecalling, alluding to the size of his genitalia, and by showing an ignorance of that which did not
interest him.
Under the “Opposed to Bureaucrats/Technocrats/Experts” category, I included times
Trump mentioned being opposed to specific bureaucratic and expert groups, such as economists,
the VA, polling companies, and political aides. Most of the entries under this category are times
Trump mentioned an opposition to common core by saying that children should be educated
locally, instead of by “bureaucrats in Washington.” While Trump attacked his opponents many,
many times in the speeches in this study, I only included an attack in the “Evil Opponents”
category when it made a moral judgement on the person, such as when he said “the press are
terrible people” (7/11/15). Trump also made several statements identifying his opponents as not
evil, which is another way he did not behave as Mudde would expect a populist to. I coded a
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statement as a part of the “Identifying opponents as not evil” category when he recognized an
opponent as a “good guy,” a “nice person,” or used similar verbiage.
The final categories are the “New Party” category, the “Support Republican Party”
category and the “Connected to Elite” category. I included statements in which Trump criticized
Republicans as a part of the “New Party” category, as well statements in which Trump linked the
two parties as being the same. In the “Support Republican Party” category, I included statements
in which Trump praised the Republican party or the Republican National Committee, a final way
in which he broke with what Mudde would expect of a populist. Finally, in the “Connected to the
Elite” category I included statements in which Trump bragged about how rich he was, said that
knew the system better than anyone else, and mentioned celebrities he knew.

Results
Populist Components
From the thirty-six speeches I listened to, I observed 1487 statements from Trump that fit
into the populist categories as identified by Mudde and Moffitt. The components most evident
were that Trump referred to “the people,” 104 times over the course of the speeches, attacked the
groups he designated as “elite” 882 times, invoked a crisis of representation 457 times, called out
“others” 188 times, demonstrated bad manners 117 times, and made statements that connected
himself to the elites 110 times. The full results appear in the Table 1.3. Included in bold are the
results for the times in which Trump made statements that would contradict what would be
expected of a populist based on the components as identified by Moffitt and Mudde.
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Table 1.3: Trump’s Use of the Components of Populism
“The People”

104

“The Elite”

882

Common Sense

12

Crisis of Representation

457

No negotiation, deliberation, compromise

82

Open to negotiation, deliberation, compromise

25

Populists target “Others”

188

Anti- “Political Correctness”

18

Opposed to Bureaucrats, Technocrats and Experts

28

Bad Manners

117

Evil Opponents

29

Identifying opponents as not evil

33

New Party

23

Support Republican Party

4

Supports Experts

2

Connected to Elite

110

Groups
During the 36 speeches, Trump made 1070 statements attacking groups that he argued
opposed him, and by extension, the people. The two main groups that Trump attacked were
politicians (450 times) and the media (226 times). Other groups that were often mentioned
negatively were undocumented immigrants (78), special interests (57), donors (78), and lobbyists
(36). Complete results are shown in Table 1.4.
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Table 1.4: “Elite” and “Other” Groups in Trumpian populism
Politicians

450

The Media

226

Muslims

33

Immigrants

78

Refugees

33

Black Lives Matter

28

Special Interests

57

Donors

78

Lobbyists

36

PACs

8

Hedge Funds

8

Protestors

17

Big Business/Wall Street

7

Change over Time
Interestingly, the mentions of direct invocations of “the elite” and “the people” increased
drastically starting with the Republican Convention in July 2016. Before the convention, Trump
would speak without a teleprompter, and seemed to almost randomly choose from a collection of
topics he cared about, changing from speech to speech. Starting with the convention and
continuing through the general election, however, Trump’s campaign became more
conventional, with him reading speeches off a teleprompter. Trump’s earlier speeches, delivered
without the use of a teleprompter, were rambling and unscripted, showing that they were coming
directly from Trump. On the other hand, the later speeches, read from teleprompters, were more
likely a collaboration between Trump and campaign speech writers, such as Stephan Bannon,
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who joined the campaign around the time of the Republican convention, and Steve Miller, who
wrote the speech Trump gave at the Republican convention. These later speeches contained
significantly more direct mentions of “the people” and “the elite.”
In the 27 speeches from his campaign announcement to the speech I coded from early
July 2016, Trump mentioned “the people” 42 times (or 1.55 times per speech); in the nine
speeches starting with the convention, Trump mentioned “the people” 62 times (6.8 times). This
drastic change points to the fact that at least on the topic of directly speaking of “the people,”
Trump’s populist rhetoric resulted from the professionalization of his campaign and from the
minds of speechwriters such as Steven Miller and Steve Bannon, instead of from his own
imagination.

Discussion
Components Shared by Moffitt and Mudde
“The People”
Donald Trump mentioned “the people” 104 times over the course of the 36 speeches and
contrasted “the people” with “the elite” 43 times. At the beginning of his campaign, this took the
form of references of “the silent majority.” In a speech in July 2015, Trump mentioned a silent
majority that wanted “to go out, they want to have a good life, they want to work hard, they want
to have a family, they don’t want to go to rallies” (7/11/15). In August, he referred to himself as
a member of the silent majority and said that “we’re tired of being pushed around and being led
by stupid people” (8/17/15). Trump often echoed this idea, that “the people in this country are
tired of being taken advantage of” (10/29/15). As the summer of 2015 turned to fall, Trump
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would invoke the “silent majority” as attending his rallies, arguing that “they used to call us the
silent majority, it’s not silent anymore, and it is a majority” (10/10/15).
A main theme of Trump’s rhetoric was that he, unlike his opponents, was not a traditional
politician and not controlled by lobbyists, donors, and special interests. He contrasted himself
with his opponents, saying that “you (the people) are my bosses, not the lobbyists, not the special
interests, not the donors” (12/5/18). He referred to himself as “owing these people (the crowd),
not them (lobbyists, special interests, donors)” (12/21/15). He painted himself as the
representative of the people, saying that as President he would be “Donald Trump, representing
all of us” (2/19/16) and that “with me, I’m representing you. Just you (not special interests and
lobbyists” (6/2/16). He often touted his connection with the people, noting that “I have a ton of
people who want to endorse but want to meet with me, get dinner first...I don’t want to be with
them, I want to be with you” (2/29/16).
As noted previously, Trump’s use of rhetoric invoking “the people” and “the elite”
drastically increased beginning with his convention speech in July of 2016 and continued
throughout the rest of his campaign. During this time, he read speeches from the teleprompter,
allowing him to stay “on message” to a greater degree and read the words of speeches written
with help from populist campaign staffers. The convention speech, written by Stephen Miller,
includes the most mentions of “the people” of any of the 36 speeches, with 17 (Hackman 2016).
In this speech, Trump remarks that “the American people will come first again” and that “every
day I wake up determined to deliver a better life for the people all across this nation that have
been ignored, neglected and abandoned” (7/21/16). Trump tells the people that “I am your voice.
I am with you, I will fight for you, and I will win for you” (7/21/16). Near the end of Trump’s
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speech, he tells the American people that “I am asking to be your champion in the White House.
My pledge reads, I’m with you, the American people” (7/21/16).
During the last few months of the campaign, Trump used rhetoric similar to that which he
used at the Republican convention. He continued to argue that he was “fighting for all of us”
and pointed to the words of Lincoln, arguing that “the media, donor, political complex that’s bled
this country dry for many years needs to be replaced by a new government, of, for, and by the
people” (8/21/16). He contended that he will “deliver for you, the American people” and that
“this will finally be the year that the American people say enough is enough” (9/16/16,
10/12/16). Finally, Trump wrapped up his campaign on November 7, 2016, by arguing that his
campaign was “fighting for every citizen who believes government should serve the people, not
the donors, and not the special interests” (11/7/16). Trump often invoked “the people” during his
campaign speeches, especially after the Republican Convention.

“The Elite”
The elite that Trump was fighting against included politicians, the media, special
interests, lobbyists, and donors, hedge fund managers, and business elites. These groups were
often contrasted with “the people” for whom Trump and his campaign argued. Early on in his
campaign, however, Trump misunderstood the term from a populist’s perspective. In April 2016,
Trump compared himself to Washington elites, stating that “they talk about elites in
Washington...do you think they have a better plane than I do?” before stating “like hell they’re
elites, these are people who don’t have a clue” (4/27/16). In a later speech he said “These
eggheads that you watch on television...I have a nicer plane than they do, they’re not elite”
(5/2/16). He followed up that claim by saying “we’re elite folks, we’re elite” (5/2/16). These
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attempts to use the term “elite” as a positive and to describe himself and his crowd as “elite”
show a misunderstanding of the term from a populist’s perspective: instead of attacking
opponents as elite, early on in his campaign Trump used “elite” as a compliment and tried to coopt the term to fit himself and his crowd.
Trump’s use of the term “elite” fits better into the traditional populist mold starting with
his convention speech. He outlines his view of an elite compromised of “big business, elite
media, and major donors” who are “lining up behind the campaign of my opponent because they
know she will keep the rigged system in place” (7/21/16). This elite group is “throwing money at
her because they have control over every single thing she does. She is their puppet, and they pull
the strings” (7/21/16). During the speech, Trump announces that he had “joined the political
arena so the powerful can no longer beat up on people who cannot defend themselves” (7/21/16).
This rhetoric that began at the convention continued into the fall, as Trump told crowds that his
campaign was “going to take government away from the special interests...and give it back to the
voters” (8/21/16). He promises a government “that serves you and your country, not the special
interests, the donors, and the lobbyists” (8/21/16). As the campaign drew to a close, Trump
promised that “the media, donor, political complex that’s bled this country dry for many years”
would be replaced should he win (8/21/16). In Trump’s populist imagination, “the elite” was
comprised of politicians, the media, big business, special interests, donors, and lobbyists who
were “rigging the system” to favor themselves at the expense of the people.
Trump’s attacks on politicians, the elite group he attacked the most, is covered in the next
section of this paper, “Crisis of Representation.” It is unsurprising to find that Trump attacked
the media the second most often, 226 times during the speeches included in this study. He spoke
of the “elite media,” identifying the media as elite (7/21/16). Trump also tied reporters into what
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he viewed as a corrupt political system, saying “reporters who work (for mainstream outlets)
may think of themselves as reporters but they are actual cogs for a corrupt political machine”
(10/12/16). He called out the media in a myriad of other ways: by referring to them as
“dishonest” or “liars;” by charging them with unfair reporting and editing; by alleging an
existence of a liberal bias and claiming the press was protecting Hillary; by referring to the press
as stupid and bad people; and by calling out specific media outlets and personalities.
The most common way Trump called out the media was by referring to the press as
dishonest, and he did this in almost every speech I listened to. He did this in several of different
ways, including “the press is full of very dishonest people,” “the press is very dishonest,” “I was
mistreated by these people, really the most dishonest people in the world,” “these dishonest
people, mainstream media, they don’t talk about this,” and “see the dishonest people back there,
the media” (7/11/15, 10/10/15, 1/8/16, 10/12/16, 11/7/16). He made similar statements in almost
every other speech I listened to.1 Furthermore, Trump called the press liars several times, saying
“the press are liars,” “they’re dirty rotten liars these people…they’re the most dishonest people,”
and “Twitter is so great, when they lie (the press) I can just…type something out (and they have
to report it)” (7/11/15, 5/27/16, 3/12/16). Trump simply calling the press dishonest or liars was
the most frequent way in which he attacked the press.
Trump also often accused the press of unfair reporting about him and unfair editing of his
soundbites. The two main ways he did this was by accusing the press of never moving the
cameras to show his crowds and by accusing them of editing his statements to make them sound
bad. He made statements such as “the press never shows the crowds because they don’t want to,”
“the only way the cameras turn is if they’re taking out a protestor…they don’t want to show the

1

(7/25/15, 8/17/15, 8/25/15, 9/30/15, 10/29/15, 11/18/15, 12/5/15, 1/26/16, 2/29/16, 3/12/16, 3/19/16, 4/10/16,
4/27/16, 5/2/16, 5/27/16, 6/2/16, 6/29/16, 7/12/16, 8/12/16, 10/12/16, 10/29/16, 11/7/16)
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crowds,” and “I just wish the cameras could spin around and show the crowds, they never do it”
at several rallies.2 Trump also complained about editing, complaining “I say the American dream
is dead but I’m going to make it bigger and better than ever before…but they cut after dead,” and
“but the dishonest media cuts it off there” (1/8/16, 8/12/16).
Trump also alleged that the press had a liberal bias and was protecting Hillary Clinton.
He referred to the Des Moines Register as “a liberal rag” and told a crowd “all the newspapers
are bad...any answer you give will be slanted negative if you’re a conservative Republican”
(7/25/15, 5/27/16). As the general election campaign started, Trump told a crowd that “as a
Republican, and as a Republican conservative, we are at a big disadvantage. If you take a look at
how they (press) treat Crooked Hillary...” (7/12/16). Trump also argued that “the mainstream
media is trying to protect Hillary” on several occasions, once arguing that “Hillary is being
protected be the media, by the press, like no one has been protected in the history of the country.
Me, on the other hand, it’s a total pile on” (5/27/16, 9/6/16). He also alleged that “the media is an
extension of the Clinton campaign” (10/12/16). These complaints of a media with a liberal bias
have been echoed by Republicans for years and were a major way Trump attacked the media.
Furthermore, Trump argued that the press was full of stupid and bad people. Trump said
often repeated statements such as “the pundits, most of whom are not smart people,” “I guarantee
I’m smarter than all of them,” and “the press will say ‘He doesn’t believe in global
warming…let’s do IQ tests” (6/29/15, 12/5/15, 4/10/16). Furthermore, he contended that the
press was full of bad people, once telling a crowd “the press is not nice people, they don’t care
about me, they don’t care about you, they don’t care about anything. The only thing they care
about is ratings” (8/25/15). He also told crowds “reporters aren’t good people” and “the press are

2

(9/30/15, 1/26/16, 3/19/16, 10/10/15, 11/30/15, 3/12/16, 4/10/16, 6/2/16, 6/29/16, 7/12/16, 8/12/16, 10/12/16,
10/29/16)
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terrible people” (7/11/15, 7/25/15, 12/21/15, 4/10/16, 10/29/16). He also referred to the press as
“some of the worst human beings on earth,” and “scum” (7/12/16, 10/29/15).
Finally, Trump often called out specific media outlets and personalities for being unfair.
Trump’s most frequent target was the New York Times, which he referred to as “a failing paper”
that published “negative things they know are wrong,” as well as nicknaming it the “Failing New
York Times” (4/10/16, 5/27/16, 3/12/15, 6/2/16, 10/12/16). Trump also disdained CNN, saying
“CNN is terrible, they are brutal” as well as calling it out on a couple of other occasions
(10/10/15, 11/30/15, 12/5/15). He called out Politico on several occasions, including saying “it’s
a third-rate paper, its losing a ton of money,” (10/10/15, 10/29/15) as well as the Washington
Post, saying “these phony stories in the Washington Post…what a rag” (4/10/16, 6/2/16,
10/12/16). Other targets included NBC (6/29/15), the Huffington Post (10/29/15), CNBC
(11/30/15, 10/12/16), ABC (12/21/15), The Wall Street Journal (3/12/16), the Boston Globe
(4/10/16, 10/12/16), the Chicago Tribune (6/29/15) and Univision (10/12/16). By referring to
them as “dishonest” or “liars;” charging them with unfair reporting and editing, alleging an
existence of a liberal bias and claiming the press was protecting Hillary, referring to the press as
stupid and bad people and by calling out specific media outlets and personalities, Trump went
after the media as a part of the elite.
Trump spoke of a political elite of special interests, donors, lobbyists, and PACs, as well
as a business elite of hedge fund managers, Wall Street, and “Big business.” In Trump’s mind,
these elite groups controlled the politicians who were running the country through the donations
they gave them. Without defining the terms, Trump painted a picture of a corrupt political
system that was rigged against the people in favor of a small, rich, and powerful elite.
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To Trump, a former donor, donors were a main part of “the elite” that controlled the
nation’s political system. He made 78 comments about donors during the speeches, claiming that
“politicians are controlled by their donors” at almost every rally (11/30/15). This control occurs
because “politicians only want to keep their jobs, so they treat donors like royalty,” and he knew
this to be true because he “knew this business… I used to be a donor” (8/17/15, 8/12/16).
Trump tied donors into the larger political system, arguing that “the media, donor, political
complex that’s bled this country dry for many years needs to be replaced by a new government
of, for, and by the people” (8/21/16). Furthermore, “major donors are lining up behind (Hillary’s)
campaign because they know she will keep the rigged system in place” (7/21/16). Donors who
control politicians and have rigged the system to their benefit are a major part of Trump’s
conception of the elite.
Trump made 57 comments about “special interests” in the speeches, without once
defining what he meant. His main claim was that politicians are “controlled by the special
interests,” and he made this claim in almost every speech I listened to (11/18/15). He argued that
“special interests are supporting Bush and Rubio and Hillary,” and contrasted that with his own
relationship to the “special interests,” saying “they’re going to have special interests call me, but
I didn’t take their money” (9/30/15, 3/19/16). After listing several problems the country is
facing, Trump charged that “it’s the special interests that do this stuff to our country, and they
totally control Hillary Clinton” (6/29/16).
Again, it is hard to tell who Trump is referring to when he attacks the “special interests.”
He told one crowd “lobbyists, special interests, donors- some of them are friends of mine,”
which seems to imply that they are individuals (10/10/15). At the Republican convention, he said
that some of the reforms he was proposing “would be opposed by some of the nation’s most
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powerful special interests” because “these special interests have rigged our nation’s economic
system for their exclusive benefit” (7/21/16). This quote makes it seem like the “special
interests” Trump is referring to are business interests. However, he told a different crowd “you’re
tired of a government that only works for Wall Street and the special interests,” which implies
that Wall Street (or business generally) and the special interests are different entities (11/7/16).
Other quotes, such as “families who have lost people to illegals have no special interests to
represent them” and “my government reforms will make your voices heard, not the voices of the
special interests” (7/21/16, 8/21/16). Finally, Trump’s statement “we’re going to break up the
special interest monopoly and we’re going to win this election for the American people” makes it
seem possible that the phrase “special interest” covers all involved in the process, donors,
lobbyists, and politicians (10/21/16). Vaguely defined “special interests” were part of the elite in
Trump’s populist imagination.
Lobbyists are another group in Trump’s elite, and he made 36 comments identifying
lobbyists as elite during the speeches. Just like donors and special interests, Trump charged,
“when lobbyists give money, they have total control over their little politician” (11/18/15). While
talking about bringing jobs at Ford back to the United States, he gave the example of the
politicians making the decision “getting a call from the lobbyist for Ford,” saying “you can’t do
that to Ford, because Ford takes care of me and I take care of you” (6/16/15). Trump connects
lobbyists to the broken political system at large, articulating that often “innocent people suffer
because our political system…has sold out to some corporate lobbyist for cash” (7/21/16). He
argued that he was different, because “it’s easy to turn down lobbyists when you don’t take their
money” (10/10/15).
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The last link of the political elite Trump argued were controlling politicians were PACs,
which he mentioned a mere eight times during the speeches, all during October and November of
2015. Trump contended that “SuperPacs are a big scam- they control the candidates” and that
“politicians are controlled like puppets by their PAC” (11/18/15, 10/29/15). He also lamented the
effect SuperPacs were having on the political system as a whole, saying “the SuperPacs are
controlling the system” and “SuperPacs are really hurting our political system” (10/29/15).
Trump argued that SuperPacs were a tool used by lobbyists, alleging that “the lobbyists control
(Republican opponents), usually through SuperPacs” (10/29/15).
Along with the political elite, Trump also identified hedge fund managers, Wall Street
and “big business” as an economical elite. He mentioned hedge fund managers eight times and
big business and Wall Street seven times. Interestingly, all but two of these mentions occurred in
July 2016 or later, pointing that attacks on the economic elite were a part of Trump’s more
professional campaign instead of his earlier rambling appeals. Both early mentions of hedge fund
managers occurred in a speech delivered in September 2015, when Trump said “the hedge fund
guys need to pay” and “my friends in the hedge fund business are going to start paying taxes”
(9/12/15). He also compared campaign donations from hedge funds to himself and Hillary,
saying that hedge fund managers “aren’t giving her money for their health, they’re not doing it
for the good of the country” (8/12/16). Furthermore, he contended that “Hillary Clinton’s
campaign is funded by hedge fund managers” (8/21/16, 9/16/16).
Trump referred to big business and Wall Street seven times, starting September 2016 and
continuing through election day. He contended that “Hillary Clinton’s campaign is funded by
Wall Street” (8/21/16, 9/16/16). Furthermore, “a vote for Hillary is a vote for…more Wall Street
cheating” (10/12/16). During a campaign rally the day before the election, he told a crowd that
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the people “are tired of a government that only works for Wall Street” (11/7/16). He also
invoked big business, arguing that “big business” was “lining up behind the (Hillary) campaign
because they know she will keep the rigged system in place” (7/21/16).
In Trump’s populist imagination, America’s government was controlled by donors,
lobbyists, and special interests, who in turned control the elected officials they fund. The media
is complicit in this rigging of the system, and the donors are often hedge fund managers or
loosely defined as “Wall Street” or “Big business.” These elite groups hurt the American people
in their attempts to hold on to the power they enjoy. Attacks on these groups were the
cornerstone of Trump’s campaign rhetoric.

Common Sense
Trump only appealed to “common sense” 12 times, which is not a significant amount of
times when spread out throughout the 36 speeches. At times he used “common sense” as
evidence to support his plans, such as during his campaign announcement, when he stated that “it
only makes common sense, they’re not sending us the right people,” referring to his plan to stop
illegal immigration (6/16/15). He once referred to his plan to fix the VA as “common sense.”
(9/30/15). He sometimes attacked politicians by saying that they did not have common sense,
saying “I hate to see when people don’t have common sense” (7/11/15). Finally, he referred to
himself as “a common sense conservative” and touted that the movement he was representing
was “a movement towards common sense,” repeating the second statement in several later
speeches (2/29/16). Although he did mention “common sense” several times, an appeal to
common sense was not a major part of Trump’s campaign rhetoric.
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Crisis of Representation
Trump spent much of his campaign discussing a crisis of representation and attacking
“politicians” and the nation’s leaders. In the 36 speeches I listened to, he criticized politicians
and the government 457 times, or roughly 13 times per speech. To say that criticizing the ruling
class was a part of Trump’s campaign strategy would be an understatement. To Trump,
America’s leaders were stupid, at times morally corrupt, controlled by donors and special
interests, all talk and no action. Importantly, it was the leaders of both parties, not just
Democrats, who were afflicted with the above ills.
Above all, Trump believed that politicians are controlled by donors, special interests, and
lobbyists. In his announcement speech, he contended that politicians are “controlled fullythey’re controlled fully by lobbyists, by the donors, and by the special interests” (7/16/15). On
the topic of campaign donations, he notes that “when you see ads from Hillary or Bush or Rubiothat money is coming from special interests. And when they want something… (it gets done)”
(9/30/15). Trump often touted the fact that he was self-funding his campaign, as opposed to his
opponents; he argues that it is “always money with these politicians, money, money, money”
(11/18/15). Trump also argued that donations change the way his opponents would govern.
Speaking on his proposal to build a wall on the southern border, Trump argued that “Marco and
Ted would do nothing because they are controlled by the lobbyists and the special interests”
(3/21/15). During the general election campaign, he argued that Hillary Clinton would be unable
to renegotiate trade deals because “her donors won’t allow her to do it” (8/12/16). Finally, in an
October 2016 speech, Trump pointed to leaked emails, telling a crowd “how about where it said
‘to the public you say this, to the ones that give you money say that” (10/12/16). Trump often
argued that politicians were controlled by special interests, donors and lobbyists.
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Furthermore, Trump argued that politicians and the political system are morally corrupt,
stating in his announcement speech that “we have people that are morally corrupt. We have
people who are selling this country down the drain” (6/16/15). Similarly, he argued that the
politicians who were not stupid were “smart people who are basically corrupt” (6/29/16). Trump
also argued that the primary system was corrupt, stating “We’ve got a corrupt system...we’re
supposed to be a democracy” when it seemed possible that he could lose the nomination on the
convention floor (4/10/16). He continued speaking about a “corrupt system” into the general
election campaign, in reference to Hillary Clinton’s email scandals (7/12/16).
A major Trump campaign theme was the incompetence of politicians. This theme
surfaced early and often: in a July 2015 speech Trump said plainly, “we have incompetent
politicians” (7/11/15). At times Trump was incredulous at what he viewed as the incompetence
of politicians, saying “these politicians don’t know anything…can you believe the
incompetence” (11/30/15). After complaining that many did not think he was nice, Trump said
that it did not matter, and that “this is going to be an election of competence, not niceness”
(1/8/16). In a speech in April 2016, Trump told a crowd “we’re not going to let our very
incompetent politicians take advantage of us anymore” (4/27/16). Finally, in October of 2016,
Trump told a crowd that “we have people who don’t know what they’re doing…we need
competence and we need it fast” (10/12/16). The theme of returning competence to the
Washington was a key appeal to voters made by the Trump campaign.
Trump also frequently mentioned how America’s leaders were an international
laughingstock. Early in his campaign, Trump, referring to America’s leaders, said “we’re a
laughingstock, we’re a joke, we’re all a bunch of clowns” (6/29/15). At the end of his campaign,
Trump remarked “other countries are laughing at us,” and “the whole world is laughing at our
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country” (10/12/16, 11/7/16). These claims, that America was being taken advantage of by other
countries because of the incompetence of America’s leaders, was one way that Trump invoked a
crisis of representation to drum up support for his outsider candidacy.
The word that Trump used most often to attack politicians was “stupid,” as he referred to
the stupidity of politicians at nearly all of the speeches. At his campaign announcement, Trump
asked his audience “how stupid are our leader? How stupid are these politicians?” (7/16/15).
Trump often used “stupid” as an adjective while talking about politicians, such as when he said
“our stupid politicians say Mexico won’t pay for the wall” (10/10/15). This language continued
throughout the campaign, with examples being Trump saying “we have stupid leadership” in
February 2016 and “we have stupid people in June 2016” (2/29/16, 6/29/16). To Trump, the
American people were suffering because they were electing stupid people to lead them.
Along with moral corruption, incompetence, and stupidity, Trump argued that America’s
leaders were weak. In March 2016, he asked his crowd, “can you imagine what these people
(foreign leaders) say about the United States? How weak we are, how ineffective we are, and,
frankly, how stupid we are?” (3/12/16). In October, Trump promised “We’re not going to be the
stupid, weak people anymore” (10/12/16). Trump ran a campaign based around competence,
intelligence, strength, and an independence from donors and special interests, traits which he
alleged the nation’s leaders were badly lacking.
Interestingly, Trump did not only direct his anger at Democratic politicians, but instead at
politicians generally. He never specified that only Democrats were “controlled by special
interests” or that only Democrats were stupid. At times he even specifically attacked policies that
had been supported or implemented by Republicans in the past, such as trade deals and the Iraq
War. In fact, a couple of times he said “I’m more disappointed in the Republican in many ways,
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they talk and talk” (7/11/15). He also linked the two parties several times, saying “Democrats
and Republicans, they can’t do this, folks” (9/30/15). As his campaign ended, Trump said
“Hillary and our failed establishment have dragged us into foreign wars” (11/7/16). Trump’s
attacks on politicians in general set him apart from more traditional politicians in both parties
who usually focus on attacking only the other party.
Despite attacking both Democratic and Republican politicians, one way in which Trump
specifically attacked Democrats and the current governing regime was by alleging that Hillary
Clinton was being protected by the Obama administration in regards to her email scandal. Trump
argued that “the Justice Department has proven itself to be a political arm of the White House”
and that “after the FBI whitewashed Hillary Clinton’s email crimes, they cannot be trusted to
investigate her new crimes” (8/21/16). He believed that Hillary was “being protected by the
Democrats” and that she was “being protected by a rigged system” (12/5/15, 11/7/16). In the
mind of Donald Trump, the protection of Hillary Clinton from “her email crimes” was yet
another way that the government was failing the American people.
Of the populist components studied in this paper, Donald Trump made the most use of
invoking a crisis of representation. He invoked this crisis by attacking politicians as weak,
stupid, and incompetent. He contended that America’s leaders were controlled by those who give
them donations and had become an international laughingstock. Interestingly, he attacked
politicians of both parties, but often contended that the Democrats who were in power at the time
were protecting Hillary Clinton. Through these attacks on politicians and American’s leaders,
Trump invoked a crisis of representation that he argued only he could fix.
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No Negotiation, Deliberation, or Compromise
While both Moffitt and Mudde contend that populists do not engage in negotiation,
deliberation, or compromise, I found that Trump made statements showing an openness to
negotiation and deal-making 82 times over the course of the speeches, while making statements
that demonstrated an appeal to action over talk 25 times. The main ways in which Trump showed
an openness to negotiation were by touting himself as the author of “The Art of the Deal,”
discussing how he would be better at negotiating trade deals than the current leaders, and by
talking about the importance of negotiation and deal-making. On the other hand, he often
referred to politicians as “all talk, no action,” indicating a preference for action over deliberation.
While keeping these “all talk, no action” statements in mind, it is clear that Trump does not act
as a populist would be expected to act in this regard.
Trump spent a great deal of time demonstrating an interest in negotiation and deal
making. During his introduction speech, Trump said “we need a leader that wrote ‘The Art of the
Deal’” (6/16/15). He was fond of referring to the Art of the Deal as “one of the best books of all
time” (3/19/16). He touted his deal-making ability several times, including saying “I make good
deals. I could get other guys- great dealmakers” (7/25/15). He often argued that he would be
better at making trade deals than his opponents, including asking a crowd “Who would you
rather have making deals for you? Trump or Jeb? Trump or Hillary?” (8/17/15). Trump often
pointed to his deal-making experience as a qualification for office, noting “I’ve done so many
deals” and “I’ll make great deals, not terrible deals” (6/2/16, 7/12/16). For these reasons, Trump
does not behave a Mudde and Moffitt would expect a populist to behave on the topic of being
open to negotiation and deal-making.
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On the other hand, Trump often remarked that politicians were “all talk, no action.” He
made this claim many times throughout the campaign, stating, for example, that “politicians are
all talk, no action” many times (8/25/15). He often implied that this prevented politicians from
being able to accomplish anything, arguing “your local politician- he won’t fix anything but at
least he’ll talk to you” and “all talk, no action politicians, nothing is going to get done” (8/17/15,
11/18/15). These claims are the type of claims that Moffitt and Mudde would expect to hear from
a populist leader. While Trump clearly fits the bill as a populist in his invocation of a crisis of
representation, the evidence for him acting as Moffitt and Mudde would expect on the topic of
negotiation and deal-making is much more mixed.

How Trump Fit into the Components Shared by Both Moffitt and Mudde
Moffitt and Mudde both expect populists to use the “the people” vs. “the elite”
dichotomy, use the term “common sense,” invoke a crisis of representation, and oppose
negotiation and compromise. Trump often spoke of “the people,” especially after the Republican
convention, and attacked the groups he defined as elite an astonishing amount of times. Another
major part of his campaign rhetoric was invoking a crisis of representation, which he often did at
the same time as attacking politicians an elite. Finally, Trump rarely spoke of “common sense”
and while he did sometimes oppose negotiation and compromise, he also bragged about his skill
at negotiating, meaning the results were mixed.
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Components Specific to Moffitt
Attacking “Others”
Moffitt argues that populists “may also target others- such as asylum seekers, immigrant
workers, or particular minority groups” as “enemies of the people” and that these “others” will
be linked to “the elite” (Moffitt 2016, 55). Along with the groups Trump identifies as elitepoliticians, the media, special interests, donors, lobbyists, PACs and hedge fund managers/Wall
Street/big business, Trump identifies several groups as “other,” including Muslims,
undocumented immigrants, refugees, Black Lives Matter and protestors. To Trump, these groups
were being favored by the ruling class over “the people,” which did not include these “other”
groups.
The most frequent group to be identified by Trump as “other” were undocumented
immigrants, mostly from Mexico. Trump attacked this group 78 times during the speeches.
Beginning with the statement that started his campaign, that these immigrants were “bringing
drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists,” attacks on undocumented immigrants were a
key part of Trump’s campaign rallies (6/16/15). The main ways he did this was through charging
that undocumented immigrants were murderers, rapists, and members of gangs, by arguing that
undocumented immigrants were taking American jobs and threating American safety, and by
pointing to specific examples of those killed by illegal immigrants.
Instead of backtracking after the initial controversy, Trump doubled down, reminding a
crowd early in his campaign that “I said killers, I said drug dealers, and I said rapists,” and reaffirming immediately before the general election that undocumented immigrants were “killers,
drug lords and gang members” (6/29/15, 10/29/16). He charged that many undocumented
immigrants became gang members, making comments such as “these gangs you’ve heard about,
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a lot of them are illegals” on several occasions throughout the campaign (9/12/15, 11/18/15,
1/26/16). He also alleged that undocumented immigrants were taking American jobs, saying that
the people “don’t want people pouring in, taking their jobs and taking their homes,” and that “we
need to protect American jobs, we need to protect American safety” (6/29/16, 9/12/15). Finally,
killing two birds with one stone, Trump told a crowd that “illegal immigrants are being taken
care of better than our veterans” (10/10/15, 5/2/16). Trump had no problem coming up with
many different ways to identify undocumented immigrants as “other.”
The most frequent way Trump attacked undocumented immigrants was by portraying
them as a threat to American safety and by mentioning specific instances of crimes they
committed. He argued early in the campaign that “we’ve got to get rid of the bad ones, we have a
lot of bad ones,” and painted a picture during his speech at the Republican convention of
“nearly 1,000 illegal immigrants with criminal records…roaming free to threaten peaceful
citizens” (9/12/15, 7/21/16). At many of the speeches I listened to, he spoke of specific instances
of people being killed by undocumented immigrants.3 The individuals he mentioned the most
often were Kate Steinle, Jamiel Shaw, and an unnamed woman who was “raped, sodomized and
killed by an illegal” (5/27/16). Going past the naming of individuals, Trump vaguely referred to
“thousands of other incidences” and said after naming three victims that they were “just three
representations of the many thousands who have suffered so gravely” (11/18/15, 7/21/16).
Throughout the campaign, Trump identified undocumented immigrants as “other” by bringing up
people “sacrificed on the altar of open borders” (7/21/16).
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Trump made statements identifying Muslims as “other” 33 times during the speeches. He
used the problematic term “radical Islamic terrorism” at many of his rallies4 He told one crowd
that a way the immigration system was broken was that “If you’re a Christian from Syria its
impossible to come into the United States, if you’re a Muslim from Syria it’s one of the easiest
things to do” (9/12/15). He asked a crowd “why are we letting people in when they have a track
record of violence all over the world?” (8/12/16). At two of the campaign events I listened to,
Trump also told a discredited story about how General Pershing dipped bullets in pig’s blood to
discourage Islamic terrorism, further identifying Muslims as “other” (2/29/16, 3/12/16).
Another way Trump identified Muslims as other was by promoting conspiracy theories
that knowledge of terrorist plots was widespread in Muslim communities but that Muslims were
not turning in people they knew to be planning attacks. He told one crowd that “a lot of
(Muslims) knew (about the San Bernardino attack before it happened)” and “you have to be
vigilant…I’ve talked about the mosques…there’s something bad happening folks” (12/5/15). He
told other crowds similarly vague but frightening statements about Muslims, such as “we have to
figure out what the hell is going on” in Muslim communities and “we need to look at the
Muslims and we need to do something” (1/8/16, 4/10/16). He was clearer on what he meant in a
later rally, spelling it out to a crowd that “Muslims have to report the bad ones…they see what’s
going on and they don’t report” (5/27/16). By pushing these conspiracy theories and in the ways
presented in the last paragraph, Trump identified Muslims as “other.”
Similarly, Trump identified Syrian refugees as “other” 33 times throughout the campaign.
The most frequent he did this was by linking them to ISIS. He told one crowd “we want to take
in all these Syrians- they could be ISIS, I don’t know” and another “the refugees could be
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ISIS…and they probably are ISIS…they have ISIS flags on their cell phones” (9/30/15, 1/8/16).
Similarly, he told a different crowd that “ISIS is probably rampant here too…we’re taking in so
many people, we have no idea who they are” (8/12/16). Without directly invoking ISIS, Trump
made the same point, telling one crowd “we cannot allow people who want to destroy this
country into our country…we cannot let Syrian refugees into our country” and another “we’re
going to stop the flow of refugees into our country and keep radical Islamic terrorists the hell out
of our country” (3/12/16, 10/29/16).
Trump also identified Syrian refugees as “other” by saying they were dangerous without
directly connecting them to ISIS. He said several different times that the Syrian refugees “could
be the great Trojan Horse of all time” (11/18/15, 8/12/16, 9/6/16). and read a poem called “the
Snake” to one crowd, which was about a snake who bites a person caring for it before saying
“you knew damn well I was a snake, before you let me in” (8/12/16). As evidence to his claims
he told crowds that “refugees are all young men, they’re tough looking cookies” and that there
were “Syrians who look awfully strong” (11/18/15, 11/30/15). He often told crowds that “we
have no idea who they are” (2/29/16, 3/19/16, 5/27/16, 7/12/16, 7/21/16, 8/12/16). Finally,
during several rallies near the end of the campaign, he criticized Hillary Clinton, telling crowds
“Hillary wants 550% increase in refugees” (7/21/16, 9/6/16, 10/12/16, 11/7/16). By directly and
indirectly linking Syrian refugees to ISIS, Trump identified them as “other” at his campaign
rallies.
Trump made comments identifying “Black Lives Matter” as “other” 28 times during the
campaign rallies I listened to. He did this mostly through the use of coded language, by praising
the police and lamenting how badly they are being treated. The only time Trump directly
identified an opposition to “Black Lives Matter” during the speeches was when he told a crowd
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“all lives matter” shortly before saying “I want to thank the police; you guys are great” (2/29/16).
Comments similar to the latter were the main way he identified “Black Lives Matter” activists as
other throughout the campaign. He told crowds “we need to start honoring and respecting our
police,” “do we love our police? They are not treated fairly” and promised that should he win,
“we are going to treat our police with respect” (12/5/15, 5/27/16, 7/12/16). More dramatically, he
remarked during his speech at the Republican convention that “the attacks on our
police…threaten our very way of life” (7/21/16). He lamented that “today if a policeman talks
the wrong way they go to jail for the rest of their life” and asserted that “we will keep our
children safe…which requires supporting our law enforcement” (5/27/16, 9/616). These coded
attacks on Black Lives Matter were the only way Trump attacked African-Americans, making
attacks on African-Americans not a large part of Trump’s campaign.
An easy group for Trump to call out as “other” were protestors, and he called out
protestors nine times throughout the campaign. He said protestors were “misguided- they don’t
get it” and referred to them as “the enemy” (11/18/15, 2/29/16). Trump alleged that many
protestors had substance abuse problems, saying that he could probably change a protestor’s
mind “unless there’s a substance abuse problem, which there really might be” (1/26/16). He
called out individual protestors, telling one “go home to Mommy,” calling another one “a loser”
and mocking one for being overweight, saying “I mentioned food stamps and that guy who’s
seriously obese just went crazy” (8/12/16, 12/21/15, 11/18/15).
Trump also linked protestors to outside groups and countries. He asked one “are you
from Mexico” and spoke of protestors who “burned the American flag and held up flags from
other countries” (2/29/16, 5/2/16). A major claim that Trump made was that protestors were
being sent in by outside groups, often without specifying who was behind sending them to the
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rallies. He told one crowd that “when they have professionally staged wise guys, we have got to
fight back,” pondered “where do these people come from” and told another crowd that “they
send them in (protestors) with a little Bernie sign…made in China” (3/12/16, 4/10/16, 6/2/16).
By raising questions about the origins of the protestors and making it seem impossible that they
were there on their own volition, Trump identified protestors as “other.” By attacking groups as
“other,” Trump behaves precisely as Moffitt would expect a populist to behave.

Political Correctness
Donald Trump articulated an opposition to “political correctness” 18 times, or once every
two speeches. Most of his anti-political correctness statements were simple. For example, in a
speech in June 2015, he told a crowd “we have to be less politically correct” (6/29/15). He also
argued that America’s political correctness was hurting its ability to succeed as a country,
arguing that “we’ve become so politically correct as a country we can’t even walk, we can’t
think properly, we can’t do anything” and “we have become so politically correct that we are
impotent as a country” (9/30/15, 3/19/16). At times Trump pointed to political correctness as a
limitation that must be obeyed, such as when he said “we have to be politically correct” (instead
of being violent towards protestors) (1/8/16). While interesting, these statements made up a very
small amount of his overall campaign speeches and were not a significant part of the campaign.

Opposed to Bureaucrats/Technocrats/Experts
As outlined by Moffitt, populists often show that they are opposed to bureaucrats,
technocrats, and experts. Trump made 28 statements throughout the speeches that showed an
opposition to this group, most of which dealt with Common Core. Trump promisied crowds that
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“education will be local…we don’t want our children educated by bureaucrats from Washington,
D.C” (3/19/16). Trump also made a couple of statements that showed a distrust of economists.
He told crowds that “economists are some of the great geniuses who have never made a dollar in
their lives” and once said that “according to the economists- who I’m not a big believer in”
(9/30/15, 6/16/15).
Trump also demonstrated a distrust in political consultants and academics. During a
campaign stop at the beginning of the general election campaign, he told a crowd: “I’ve been
told by all these geniuses ‘you can’t win California.’ I think I can” (6/2/16). He also showed a
disdain for academia, as he once encouraged boos by saying “the architect of
Obamacare…remember from MIT?” and smiling as the boos rained down (10/29/16). Finally,
Trump made one statement that was opposed to bureaucrats in general, remarking during his
speech at the Republican convention that “my opponent would rather protect bureaucrats than
serve American children” (7/21/16). Overall, while Trump did hammer on the point that he
wanted the nation’s children educated locally and not by bureaucrats, a general opposition to
bureaucrats, technocrats and experts was not a major part of his campaign rhetoric.

Bad Manners
Trump demonstrated the bad manners expected of a populist 117 times during the
speeches included in this study. An example of bad manners as described by Moffitt is “ready
resort to anecdotes as evidence” (Moffitt 2016, 55). During his campaign announcement speech,
he referred to three such people he knew as evidence of larger issues: “a friend who’s a doctor,”
“a friend of mine is a great manufacturer,” and “a woman was on television this morning”
(6/16/15). Early on during his campaign, Trump told the same story at almost every rally, about a
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friend who used to buy American but now only buys from China because it is much cheaper
(6/16/15, 7/11/15, 7/25/15, 2/19/16). This use of anecdote as evidence continued throughout the
campaign, with Trump invoking his “friend the businessman,” “a doctor who came up to me,”
and “friends who go to France every year,” among others (12/21/15, 2/19/16, 9/6/16). Trump
uses anecdotes as evidence in exactly the way Moffitt would expect a populist would.
Trump also demonstrated bad manners by making fun of his opponents, protestors and,
once, giving out the personal phone number of an opponent. To press the point of the
incompetence of America’s negotiators, Trump made fun of John Kerry at several of the rallies
for getting injured during a bicycle race (6/29/15, 7/11/15, 8/25/15, 7/12/16). During a campaign
rally in October 2016, he mocked Hillary Clinton for fainting the month before (10/12/16). He
once took it one step further, reading out the personal phone number of Lindsay Graham at a
rally and encouraging the crowd to call it (8/17/15). Finally, Trump made fun of protestors
several times during the campaign. He once told one “you are a loser” and mocked another
protestor for being overweight, saying “I mentioned foot stamps and that guy who’s seriously
obese just went crazy” (12/21/15, 11/18/15). While it did not occur during one of the speeches I
listened to, Trump’s infamous attack on a handicapped reporter is another example of this
behavior. By making fun of opponents and protestors, Trump once again demonstrated bad
manners.
Many times during the campaign Trump demonstrated an affinity for conspiracy and an
ignorance of that which did not interest him. Either unwilling or unable to accept that protestors
could attend his rally without an outside incentive, Trump once said “I wonder if the Mexican
government sent them over here, I think so” (7/11/15). As his campaign came to an end, he
articulated that it was the Clinton campaign that was incentivizing protestors, saying “we just
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found out Hillary Clinton was paying the protestors $1500 each to be violent at our rallies”
(10/29/16). As the general election grew near, Trump got very concerned about voting fraud,
mentioning at several rallies that his voters must watch the polling places for incidences of voter
fraud (8/12/16, 8/21/16, 9/6/16, 10/29/16). Examples of this concern can be seen in statements
such as “we don’t want people voting five times” and “the only way we can lose is if cheating
goes on” (8/12/16). Finally, Trump demonstrated an ignorance of that which did not interest him
a couple times, saying “according to what I heard, which is probably true” during one campaign
rally and “I don’t know, I don’t read about it” concerning America’s infrastructure at another
(10/29/15, 8/12/16).
Another way Trump demonstrated bad manners was by doing negative impressions of
people, swearing, and by alluding to the size of his genitalia. In a rally in August 2015, he did a
racially based impression of a Japanese businessman, saying “He says ‘We want deal’”
(8/25/15). Trump swore 14 times during the campaign rallies I listened to, using a variety of
curse words, including “jackass,” “ass,” “bullshit,” “shit,” “dumbass,” and “chickenshit.”5 He
used these words in several different ways, once telling a crowd “I’m working my ass off,” once
criticizing “dumbass politicians,” and promising a crowd that he would “knock the shit out of
ISIS” (8/25/15, 11/30/15, 1/8/16). Finally, at one rally, Trump alluded to the size of his genitalia,
saying “they’re bigger than most, maybe not Nick’s (Trump supporter, NFL star Nick Mangold).
Hands, I’m talking about hands” (3/12/16).
Many of Trump’s attacks on Hillary Clinton were based on her appearance or gender and
were attacks that more traditional politicians would not engage in. Referring to an instance in
which Hillary used the restroom during a Democratic debate, Trump said “I know where Hillary
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went during the debate, its disgusting” (12/21/15). During the general election campaign, he
asked a crowd “do you think Hillary looks presidential?” and said that “Hillary does not look
Presidential…that is not a President” (5/27/16, 6/2/16). He also once said Hillary “got
schlonged” (12/21/15). An article in the Washington Post described this as a sexist remark, as
“schlong is a well-known reference to a man’s genitals” and “there are no alternative definitions
for the word, according to Merriam-Webster” (Moyer 2015). These attacks, based on Hillary’s
appearance and gender were another way that Trump demonstrated bad manners.
The two most prominent ways that Trump demonstrated the bad manners expected from
populists is by advocating for violence and calling his opponents name. He advocated for
violence during several of the campaign rallies that I listened to. Praising the toughness of
General Patton, he said that “General Patton would smack the reporter in the face, kick him in
the lips, give a smack to that guy” (9/30/15). Trump also advocated violence towards those who
were protesting his rallies a couple of time: during a rally at the University of Iowa, while a
woman was protesting, he asked the crowd “do you want to let the football team take care of it?”
(1/26/16). He followed this up by asking the crowd, “Am I allowed to rip the whistle out of her
mouth? Should somebody do that?” (1/26/16). These advocations of violence are yet another
way that Trump demonstrated bad manners.
Finally, the last way that Trump demonstrated bad manners was by calling his opponents
names. The three most popular of these nicknames were “Little Marco,” which Trump used
seven times (2/29/16, 3/12/16); “Lyin’ Ted,” which Trump used fourteen times6; and “Crooked
Hillary,” which Trump used twenty times.7 Trump also nicknamed Jeb Bush as “Low-energy
Jeb” (10/10/15, 5/2/16) and Bernie Sanders as “Crazy Bernie” (6/2/16). He attacked Bernie on a

6
7

3/12/16, 3/19/16, 4/10/16, 4/27/16, 5/2/16, 5/27/16, 6/2/16
4/27/16, 5/2/16, 5/27/16, 6/2/16, 6/29/16, 8/12/16, 9/16/16, 10/12/16, 11/7/16

Quigley 62
couple of occasions, referring to him as “our communist friend,” and “a nutjob,” as well as
referring to Democratic presidential candidate Martin O’Malley as a “clown” (3/12/16, 6/2/16,
1/8/16). Trump linked his opponents to animals a couple times during the speeches, saying that
“Marco Rubio is sweating like a pig” and that Mitt Romney “was a choking dog” (10/10/15,
5/27/16). He also tried out a couple of nicknames for Hillary Clinton before settling on “Crooked
Hillary,” including “Lyin’ Hillary” and “Hillary Rotten Clinton” (6/2/16, 8/12/16).
In conclusion, Trump absolutely demonstrated the bad manners that would be expected
of a populist in Moffitt’s definition of populism. These bad manners included swearing, using
anecdotes as evidence, making fun of the injured, spreading conspiracy theories, giving out the
personal phone number of an opponent, doing impressions of foreigners, advocating violence,
name-calling, alluding to the size of his genitalia, and an ignorance of that which did not interest
him. While not easily quantifiable, it was clear that Trump also engaged in the directness,
playfulness, and bullying that Moffitt would expect. Of the categories I studied, bad manners is
one of the ones that Trump exhibited most obviously.

How Trump fits into Moffitt’s Definition of Populism
Moffit expects populists to target “others,” oppose political correctness, bureaucrats, and
experts, and demonstrate bad manners. Of these components, Trump called out “others” (188
times) and demonstrated bad manners (117 times) the most. On the other hand, the populist
components of common sense, opposing political correctness, and opposing bureaucrats,
technocrats and experts were present but not a major part of Trump’s campaign rhetoric. Trump
actually signaled a willingness to negotiate and compromise 25 times throughout the campaign,
leaving mixed results for the expectation that populists will oppose negotiation, deliberation, and
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compromise. He mentioned common sense only 12 times, political correctness 18 times, and an
opposition to bureaucrats and experts 28 times, often through vague comments about making
education local. He made statements elevating action over negotiation, deliberation, and
compromise 82 times, which is significant, but also made 25 statements signaling an openness to
negotiation and compromise, relatively mixed results.
For the most part, Trump fit into Moffitt’s definition of populism. Most important to
Moffitt are the use of “the people” and “the elite,” a crisis of representation, and bad manners,
three components that were the cornerstones of Trump’s campaign speeches. However, Trump
mentioned common sense, political correctness, and an opposition to bureaucrats and experts less
than expected, and he actually made comments signaling an openness to negotiation and
compromise, which is also not expected by a populist in Moffitt’s definition. While Trump
would surely classify as a populist in Moffitt’s definition, he is not a perfect fit.

Components Specific to Mudde
Evil Opponents
A component specific to Mudde is the belief that to a populist, their “opponents are not
just people with different priorities and values, they are evil!” (Mudde 2004: 544). While Trump
made 29 comments that pointed towards him viewing his opponents as evil, he made 33
comments that depicted his opponents as generally good people: decidedly mixed results. On the
topic of evil opponents, reporters were Trump’s main target. He put it simply on several
occasions, making statements such as “reporters aren’t good people” and “the press are terrible
people” (7/11/15, 7/25/15, 12/21/15, 4/10/16, 10/29/16). He would go further, telling a crowd
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that the press “are some of the worst human beings on earth,” and once referred to the press as
“scum” (7/12/16, 10/29/15). Trump often portrayed the press as an evil opponent.
Along with the press, Trump pronounced that politicians and protestors were not good
people on several occasions. During his campaign announcement, he told the people in Trump
tower that America’s leaders were “morally corrupt” (6/16/15). Without saying which ones, he
told a crowd in November 2015 that “some (of his Republican opponents) are terrible people”
(11/30/15). He was clearer on how he viewed Hillary Clinton and Jeb Bush on several occasions,
saying that “Jeb was not a nice guy,” and “Hillary is a bad person” (3/12/16, 6/2/16).
Furthermore, he alluded to Hillary as “the devil” when he said that “Bernie sold his soul to the
devil (by supporting Hillary)” (10/29/16, 11/7/16). Finally, on a couple of occasions he called
out individual protestors, saying that one was “a bad guy” and that another was “not a good
person” (12/21/15, 1/8/16).
On the other hand, Trump often told crowds that his opponents were not bad people.
Contradicting himself on whether Jeb Bush is a good person, Trump said “Jeb Bush is a good
guy,” and “Jeb Bush is a really nice person” several times (6/29/15, 11/18/15, 8/17/15, 8/25/15,
10/10/15). He told a crowd that his Republican opponents were “all nice people” (1/8/16) and
specifically referred to the following people as “nice” or “good people”: Chris Christie (6/29/15,
5/2/16), Rick Perry (9/12/15, 11/30/15, 12/5/15), Ben Carson (9/12/15, 12/5/15, 5/2/16), Carly
Fiorina (10/10/15, 5/2/16), Ted Cruz (11/30/15, 6/2/16), Scott Walker (12/5/15), Lindsay
Graham (1/8/16), John Kasich (3/19/16, 5/2/16, 6/2/16), Marco Rubio (8/25/15, 10/10/15,
11/18/15) and Mitt Romney (10/10/15, 1/26/16).
Trump extended his goodwill even towards politicians in general, several democratic
politicians, and prominent members of the media. He told crowds “I don’t think our leaders are
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bad people” and that politicians “are for the most part nice people” (7/11/15, 10/10/15). Despite
criticizing both many times throughout his campaign, Trump told one crowd that “John Kerry is
a nice man” and that he did not “think Obama is a bad person” (6/29/15, 7/11/15). Surprisingly,
Trump also identified prominent members of the media as good people, namely Don Lemon, Jeff
Zucker (CEO of CNN), Joe Scarborough, Bill Maher, and Wolf Blitzer (9/30/15, 8/25/15,
10/29/15, 1/26/16). Overall, on the topic of whether Trump behaves as a populist would be
expected to regarding the morality of their opponents, there are mixed results. On one hand,
Trump at times referred to the media, politicians, and individual protestors as being bad people.
On the other, Trump often referred to many of the members of the above groups as good people,
including almost all of his political opponents. These mixed results suggest that Trump does not
behave exactly as a populist would be expected to on this topic.

New Party
Mudde writes that populists “oppose the established parties” and “call for, or claim to be,
a new kind of party” (Mudde 2004: 546). In his invocations of a crisis of representation, Trump
surely opposes the established parties and sets himself up as a non-political outsider who could
shake up the system. For this section, however, I recorded the times that Trump criticized his
Republican party or made statements that linked the parties as being practically the same. He
made claims along these lines 23 times, and claims supporting the Republican Party four times.
Trump did not once call to create his own party or end up running as an independent; rather, he
reshaped the Republican Party in his own image. Technically, Trump did not “call for, or claim
to be a new kind of party,” but he did represent a change in the Republican party. For these
reasons, the results for this component of populism are rather inconclusive.
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Trump linked the two parties as being similar and similarly unable to get the job done. He
told one crowd “Democrats and Republicans, they can’t do this folks,” separating himself from
the two major parties, including his own (9/30/15). A couple times during the campaign he made
statements linking the two major parties, including comparing Hillary Clinton and Republican
frontrunner at the time Jeb Bush by saying “it’s all the same, the system is all the same”
(7/25/15). Similarly, he once told a crowd that “special interests are supporting Bush and Rubio
and Hillary,” not differentiating between the two parties (9/30/15). Statements such as this one
and many of the ones included in the “crisis of representation” section of this paper demonstrate
how Trump often set himself apart from “politicians” and “the nation’s leaders,” not quite calling
for the creation of a new party but surely making it known that he represented a change with the
way our country has been run in recent history, by both parties.
Trump also made many statements criticizing his party, the Republican Party. Separating
himself from the party, he once told a crowd “we’re driving the Republican establishment crazy,
because they want their puppet” (11/30/15). He spoke out against congressional Republicans on
several occasions, telling a crowd “I’m more angry with Republicans than I am with the
Democrats,” and, similarly, “I’m more disappointed in the Republicans in many ways, they talk
and talk” (12/21/15, 7/11/15). He echoed this complaint, that congressional Republicans were
failing in their duty to deliver for their voters, several times, telling one crowd “the Republicans
are constantly bailing Obama out” and telling another “these politicians gets elected and go to
Washington and do a total fold” (2/19/16 12/21/15). Trump’s criticisms of the Republican party
went beyond what most politicians would say about their own parties.
Finally, Trump made four statements during his campaign praising the Republican party
and his partnership with the RNC. Disputing reports that his relationship with the Republican

Quigley 67
party had soured, Trump told a crowd “we’re raising a lot of money for the Republicans…Reince
(Priebus) has done an incredible job,” before promising the crowd “if we had a bad relationship,
you’d be the first to know” (8/12/16). During his short victory speech, he called Reince on stage
and told his supporters that “our partnership with the RNC was so important in our success”
(11/9/16). Despite criticizing both parties and making it clear that he represented a drastic
change, Trump ran as a Republican, leaving no strong conclusions to be drawn as to whether he
represented “a new type of party” in the words of Mudde.

Supports Experts
There is little evidence to support the assertion that Trump supported experts, as Mudde
argued populists can. He made a mere two statements voicing a support for experts. He told one
crowd “I’m a big person for academia, I believe in it,” and another “some of the greatest legal
experts supported me” on his assertion that people born in the U.S to undocumented immigrants
should not be US citizens (9/30/15, 10/10/15). On the contrary, he made several statements that
showed a distrust of experts, including academic experts (the creator of Obamacare from MIT
mentioned earlier) and climate scientists. He told one crowd that “it was supposed to be warm
today, but it’s freezing…I need some global warming!” and another “they say global warming,
they say something else, it changes every day” (4/10/16, 6/29/15). Trump’s limited use of
rhetoric that showed support for experts and attacks on experts show that he is not the kind of
expert-supporting populist that Mudde argues exists.
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Connected to Elite
Mudde argues that populists connect themselves to the elite without being a part of them,
and Trump certainly fits this bill, as he made 110 statements during the campaign that in which
he linked himself to the elite. Trump often bragged that no one knew the system as well as he
did, which would allow him to fix it. He regularly spoke on how he was connected to politicians,
lobbyists, and other donors from his years of donating to politicians and being a rich
businessman. He also often mentioned his Ivy League education (He graduated with a Bachelor
of Science in Economics from the Wharton School of Finance at the University of Pennsylvania)
and how rich he was, as well as name-dropping celebrities who he knew. Being connected to the
elite was a major part of Trump’s campaign rhetoric.
Trump often bragged that he knew the system better than anyone, so he knew how to fix
it. He told crowds “nobody knows the game better than me,” “I’ve been on the other side of it
(the system), I know it better than anyone,” and “I know the system very well. I know the system
better than anybody” (11/30/15, 6/29/16, 8/21/16). He often touted the fact that he donated to
both Democrats and Republicans, and he knew the perks that came along with donating to
politicians. He told crowds “I was a businessman, I gave to everyone,” and “I deal with
politicians all my life, I’ve made a lot of money dealing with politicians” (10/10/15, 7/11/15). He
would also tell stories about how he “was totally establishment, (politicians) would come to my
office” (11/18/15). Trump told a crowd “I have seen first hand how the system is rigged against
our citizens,” and asked another “do I know this business or what? I used to be a donor”
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(7/21/16, 8/12/16). He made several other comments about knowing the system8 and donating to
politicians.9
Along with knowing the politicians, another factor of knowing the system was his
connections to lobbyists, “special interests,” hedge fund managers, and the other donors. He
frequently made statements such as “I have lobbyists that can produce anything for me,” and “I
know half of the lobbyists, I know so many lobbyists, I used to use them” (6/16/15, 1/26/16). He
made many similar statements.10 He also made statements about he knew the “special interests,”
hedge fund managers, and other donors. He told a crowd that he “knew so much about the
lobbyists and special interests,” and another “my friends in the hedge fund business are going to
start paying taxes” (6/2/16, 9/12/15). Finally, he referred to the fact that he knew other larger
donors, saying “the money Jeb is spending is coming from friends of mine” (9/30/15). Trump’s
contention that he could change the game relied on the fact that he knew its players.
Another way that Trump articulated a connection to the elite was his mentions of
members of the media, television personalities, and other celebrities. Trump complained about
negative coverage coming from “reporters I’ve known for a long time” and told a crowd that “the
head people from NBC came to my office and begged me not to run” (7/11/15, 8/17/15). He
touted his status being closely tied to the elite by bragging “I was hosting Saturday Night
Live…my mother and my father would never have believed it” (8/25/15). Trump mentioned that
he knew other media personalities as well throughout the campaign, namely Don Lemon, Jeff
Zucker (CEO of CNN), Joe Scarborough, Bill Maher, and Wolf Blitzer (9/30/15, 8/25/15,
10/29/15, 1/26/16). Finally, he mentioned a couple of other celebrities who he knew, including

8

8/17/15, 9/30/15, 10/10/15, 10/29/15, 11/18/15, 12/5/15, 12/21/15, 1/8/16, 2/19/16, 6/2/16, 6/29/16, 7/21/16,
8/21/16, 10/29/16
9 6/16/15, 7/25/15, 8/17/15, 9/12/15, 11/30/15, 12/21/15, 1/8/16, 1/26/16, 2/9/16, 5/27/16
10 7/11/15, 7/25/15, 8/25/15, 10/10/15, 11/18/15, 1/8/16, 1/26/16, 8/21/16
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George Steinbrenner, Tom Brady, and “a friend of mine, one of the biggest celebrities in the
world,” whom he left unnamed (11/30/15, 1/26/16, 10/29/15).
One final way Trump flouted his status as tied to the elite was by bragging about how
rich he was and touting his elite education. He often bragged about how rich he was, saying “I’m
really rich” (6/16/15, 10/29/15, 11/18/15, 3/12/16, 5/2/16). This bragging included touting how
he was richer than his opponents, as he told a crowd “I have more money than all of my
opponents combine,” and by joking “we’re closing loopholes on the very rich- that’s me, I don’t
like that” (3/12/16, 9/30/15). Pointing to financial records he released, he told crowd several
times “I’m richer than everyone thought I was.”11 Along with wealth, Trump also mentioned the
tremendous assets he has, making statements such as “I have some of the greatest real estate in
the world.”12 Finally, Trump fought back against claims that he is not smart by touting his elite
education, telling crowds “I went to the Wharton school of finance.”13 By bragging about his
wealth, assets, and education, Trump made it known to the crowds at his rallies that he was
closely connected to the moneyed elite.

How Trump fits into Mudde’s Definition of Populism
New to Mudde’s definition were expectations that populists would identify their
opponents as evil, call for a new party, support experts, and demonstrate a connection to the elite.
Three of these components had mixed or small results. Trump identified his opponents as not
evil 33 times during the speeches and identified his opponents as evil 29 times throughout the
campaign: mixed results. Calling for a new party was not a major part of Trump’s campaign, as

11

7/11/15, 7/25/15, 8/17/15, 10/10/15, 10/29/15, 11/18/15, 11/30/15, 2/29/16
6/29/15, 12/5/15, 12/21/15, 1/8/16, 2/19/16, 3/12/16, 4/10/16, 4/27/16, 5/27/16, 8/12/16, 10/12/16, 10/29/16
13 6/29/15, 7/11/15, 7/25/15. 8/17/15, 9/30/15, 10/10/15, 12/21/15, 1/26/16, 2/29/16, 4/27/16, 8/12/16, 9/16/16
12
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he criticized Republicans only 23 times throughout the campaign. Trump made two statements
supporting experts and 33 statements opposing them, not acting in the way Mudde contends that
populists can act. However, one of the Mudde specific components surfaced 110 times during the
speeches I listened: the expectation that populists connect themselves to the elite.
Overall, Trump acted as Mudde would expect a populist would act in the most important
way, by using the people/elite dichotomy, but the results on the other categories are mixed. He
invoked a crisis of representation and connected himself to the elite, but the results on the rest of
Mudde’s expectations are mixed at best. Trump fits into Mudde’s definition of populism, as he
uses most of Mudde’s components in one way or another, but he fits better into Moffitt’s
performative definition of populism. Table 1.5 shows how the Trump fit (and how he did not fit)
into their definitions. Times when Trump acted differently than what they expected are in bold.
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Table 1.5: Moffitt and Mudde Components of Populism with Results
Component of Populism

Scholar

Results

“The People”

Both Moffitt and Mudde

104

“The Elite”

Both Moffitt and Mudde

882

Common Sense

Both Moffitt and Mudde

12

Crisis of Representation

Both Moffitt and Mudde

457

No negotiation, deliberation,
compromise

Both Moffitt and Mudde

82

Open to negotiation,
deliberation, compromise

Both Moffitt and Mudde

25

Populists target “Others”

Moffitt

188

Anti- “Political Correctness”

Moffitt

18

Opposed to Bureaucrats,
Technocrats and Experts

Moffitt

28

Bad Manners

Moffitt

117

Opponents are evil

Mudde

29

Identifying Opponents as
not evil

Mudde

33

Call for new party

Mudde

23

Support Republican Party

Mudde

4

Can Support Experts

Mudde

2

Connected to Elites

Mudde

110

Elite and Other Groups in Trumpian Populism
Traditionally, right-wing populists in America have attacked politicians and bureaucrats,
both political parties, the media, African-Americans, protestors, intellectuals, and immigrants as
the groups that have historically been a part of these groups. George Wallace, Ronald Reagan,
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and the Tea Party all spoke out against politicians and bureaucrats, and Trump follows in their
tradition in the attacking politicians but is less focused on attacking bureaucrats. Wallace, Nixon,
Reagan, and the Tea Party all opposed the media, as did Trump. Trump often attacked
undocumented immigrants, a tactic that was also embraced by the Tea Party. Finally, Wallace,
Nixon and Reagan called out protestors (both at their own rallies and protestors in general), and
Trump did as well. In these ways, Trump behaved in the tradition of past American right-wing
populists.
On the topic of other groups, however, Trump did not attack both political parties,
African-Americans, and intellectuals in the same way that past populists had. Wallace ran for
President as an independent, which is not something Trump had to or chose to do. His attacks on
both political parties were more similar to those used by the Tea Party, who attacked politicians
while being clearly aligned with the Republican party. While Trump did attack Black Lives
Matter, attacking African- Americans was not a major part of his campaign rhetoric and was not
nearly as important to him as it was to Wallace and Nixon. Finally, while Trump did make
several comments calling out intellectuals during the speeches, attacking intellectuals was far
from a major part of the Trump campaign.
Trump also added a few new groups into the rhetoric of right-wing populism in America.
Past right-wing populists such as Wallace, Nixon, and Reagan did not attack donors, lobbyists
and “special interests” in the way Trump did. Similarly, none of these past populists spoke out
against hedge fund managers, PACs, “Wall Street” and “Big business” as Trump did, a very
interesting development. Perhaps a sign of the times, Trump was also the first to include
Muslims and refugees in his populist rhetoric. While the groups Trump attacked the most,
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politicians and the media, had been attacked by past populists, Trump used populist rhetoric to
define “the elite” and “undeserving minority groups” in a different way than past populists.

Conclusion
Judged by his use of populist rhetoric, Trump is far from a perfect fit into either Moffitt
or Mudde’s definitions of populism. While he often mentioned “the people,” invoked a crisis of
representation, attacked “elites” and “others,” demonstrated bad manners and linked himself to
the elite, his use of the other components expected of populists is mixed at best. Interestingly,
Trump’s invocations of “the people” increased drastically at and after the Republican
convention, pointing to a role of strategists in helping him hone his rhetoric in a more populist
way. Trump attacked politicians and the media as past right-wing populists in America had, but
his inclusions of groups such as donors, lobbyists, and “special interests” was a new
development in right-wing populist rhetoric in America.
As demonstrated in this paper, Trump’s populism was more similar to the performative
populism that Moffitt describes than the ideological populism that Mudde describes. Trump
demonstrated the main parts of both definitions, but he demonstrated bad manners and targeted
“others” as Moffitt expects to a greater extent than any of the components that Mudde outlines.
Furthermore, the Trump’s drastic increase in the use of the “the people” vs “the elite” dichotomy
further points to the fact that populism is more of a performance than an ideology to Trump.
Populists who ideologically believe what they are saying, instead of using populism as a
performance, are more likely to push for populist policy outcomes. This is especially true in
Trump’s case, as Trump’s policies since becoming President have seemingly done little to help
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his white working-class base. Trump’s failure to deliver for this group could lead to their already
low faith in government dropping even further.
Along with this disparity between rhetoric and action, right-wing populism in America is
dangerous because it inherently attacks institutions and norms that are important to our success
thus far as a democratic government. The bad manners that Trump showed on the campaign trail
are disturbing and the coarsening and dumbing-down of rhetoric in the political arena is
problematic. Trump’s attacks on important democratic institutions, including the media and law
enforcement agencies such as the FBI, hurt the public’s trust in these institutions, and thus our
democracy at large. Institutions and norms are crucial in our democracy, and Trump’s continued
attacks on them are harmful to democratic government in America.
There are many different ways scholars could expand upon this thesis. A first path of
inquiry would be to study Trump’s past and continued use of this rhetoric. This study only looks
at campaign speeches, it would be interesting to examine whether this language continued,
lessened, or increased after Trump took the oath of office. Trump was interested in politics long
before his campaign for President in 2016, a look at speeches he gave earlier in his career and
especially as he became more involved in politics during Obama’s presidency would allow
scholars to find if Trump had always been populist, or if populism was unique to his run for
President in 2016. Finally, since this study only looks at campaign speeches, other methods
Trump used to communicate to voters, such as through debates and tweets, have been left out.
An examination of Trump’s tweets from throughout the campaign could be another way to study
Trump’s use of populist rhetoric as he ran for President.
Furthermore, studying whether this language is specific to Trump or part of a larger PostTea Party conservative phenomenon and whether Trump invented this specific kind of populist
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rhetoric or picked it up from others would be fascinating. A look at whether Republican talk radio
hosts such as Glenn Beck, Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity used this language would be helpful
in determining if Trump was echoing what he had heard others say or if the language was uniquely
his. A look at whether Trump’s Republican opponents in the 2016 primaries used this language,
or if they began using it as Trump became more successful, would also help in clarifying the origins
of Trump’s populist rhetoric. Finally, studying more directly the links between Sarah Palin, the
Tea Party, and Trump would allow scholars to examine if Trump is an extension of the Tea Party
or something new entirely. The question of the origins of Trump’s populist rhetoric remains
unanswered.
The Donald Trump phenomena, which baffled the public, pundits, political scientists
alike, is a topic that will be studied by political scientists and spoken about among pundits for
generations to come. Many will describe him as a populist, which, while not a perfect definition,
fits Trump quite well. Trump’s populism is more performative than ideological, as he fits into
Moffitt’s definition better than Mudde’s and his use of populist rhetoric drastically increased as
his campaign became more professional. Trump’s exclusionary, performative populism is
dangerous, as it is largely disconnected from policy and attacks valuable institutions and norms.
Trumpian populism is a disturbing development in recent American politics, and is dangerous to
the health of American democracy.
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Appendix 1.1
Speeches:
6/16/15 http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/
7/11/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oKeXxvOrTkI
7/25/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lOzs1BfHcXU
8/17/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8kzIsLiZhDs
8/25/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MDYMC8wSC1Y
9/12/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f42Gg55Xmq0
9/30/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xxTwdjzZt5c
10/10/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQXXytNw0Do
10/29/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QKs_qDJe0bs
11/18/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RiLovCRilJY
11/30/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3c6za9xw5Ko
12/5/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cEkHBtVYqJA
12/21/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hXeFm0OecKk
1/8/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oV1t3Ppa9dw
1/26/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZkANNBt_uLw
2/19/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RfUxoOFk0HI
2/29/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HVjemTen0P8
3/12/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0_2DgkKUwr4
3/19/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=26JeLvGXbas
4/10/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xVs69_aWvpY
4/2716 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_YDdcZ9oo4
5/2/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_nbTt9KJ6Sc
5/26/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CqRkv9VTaMQ
6/2/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sppj-0RRYH8
6/29/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VSwkNWgbhto
7/12/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dM6o3D9rTVE
7/21/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=34Svt3kfq1c
8/12/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CFz51NcVBhQ
8/22/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RWKz9zYNUzM
9/6/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKnK0NKByhg
9/16/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jEVyT_EbkPo
10/12/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dni4DBIdXtw
10/29/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pf_2CGUSLHg
11/7/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pRBRsSSByMA
11/9/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qsvy10D5rtc

